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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing legislative mechanisms that guarantee equilibrium
existence, Pareto-efficiency, and inclusiveness. To address this question, we propose a finite-
horizon voting procedure that embeds clauses of reciprocity. These clauses grant voters the
right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and
punish harmful actions. We study voters’ strategic behavior under this voting procedure using
two classical approaches. Following the blocking approach, we introduce two related solution
concepts—the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set—to predict equilibrium
policies. We then show that these solution concepts (1) are always non-empty; (2) only select
Pareto-efficient policies; (3) strategically protect minority interests; and (4) are compatible
with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice in distributive problems. Following the
non-cooperative approach, we provide an implementation of each of these solution concepts
in subgame perfect equilibrium, which makes them applicable in a wide range of legislative
settings. We also extend them to effectivity functions, a large class of games that includes
strategic form games. A comparative analysis shows that the reciprocity mechanism has other
desirable features and properties that distinguish it from other well-known voting mechanisms
and solution concepts.
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1 Introduction
This paper solves the problem of designing legislative mechanisms that guarantee equilibrium exis-
tence, Pareto-efficiency, and inclusiveness. Studies show that the pursuit of self-interest generally
leads to the emergence and persistence of public policies that are inefficient and non-inclusive.1
Experimental studies suggest that these issues can be resolved if agents are induced to display re-
ciprocal and pro-social behaviors in decision-making.2 However, to our knowledge, in the context
of voting, there does not currently exist any formal mechanism that is able to incentivize selfish
agents to display such behaviors. This study addresses this problem by proposing a simple voting
procedure that incorporates clauses of reciprocity and therefore provides incentives for agents to
display reciprocal and pro-social behaviors. To capture rational behavior under this procedure, we
define two related solutions concepts following the blocking approach and implement them using
a non-cooperative implementation-theoretic approach. Our voting procedure therefore leads to a
mechanism that we call a political reciprocity mechanism. We show that the solution concepts guar-
antee the existence of an equilibrium, Pareto-efficiency, and inclusiveness in that they strategically
protect minority interests and are compatible with well-known concepts of fairness and Rawlsian
justice. We provide an overview of our analysis and main results below.
1.1 A voting procedure with reciprocity clauses
Let N be a set of agents, A a set of policies, C a constitution that defines winning coalitions,
and V a voting procedure consisting of finite or infinite stages. A political economy is defined as
PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V, R(θ)〉, where θ is a state of the world, and R(θ) is a profile of preferences
defined over the policy space A. In this paper, we primarily study political economies in which the
voting procedure V ≡ V rm comprises the following four stages. Stage 0: A status quo policy
x ∈ A is chosen by Nature, a social planner or an agent. Stage 1: A winning coalition S can object
against x by proposing a policy y. If no winning coalition objects, x remains in place and the voting
process ends. If a winning coalition objects by proposing y, Nature can end the voting process and
in this case, y becomes the new policy. If Nature does not end the process, it continues to the next
stage.3 Stage 2: Each agent i /∈ S can oppose y. If there is no opposition, y is adopted and the
process ends. If there is any opposition, S is given the opportunity to withdraw y in the next stage.
Stage 3: If S withdraws y, x remains in place and the process ends. If S maintains y, the process
moves to the final stage. Stage 4: The opposing agents can form a winning coalition T to replace
y with z. If T succeeds, z is elected and the process ends. Otherwise, y is elected and the process
ends.
1See, for example, Falkinger et al. (2000), and Acemoglu et al. (2011).
2See, for instance, Axelrod (1984), Fehr and Gächter (1998), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Falk and Fischbacher
(2006), and Nash et al. (2012). A reciprocal behavior consists of returning favor for favor and harm for harm, and
opposing harmful actions. A pro-social behavior is an action that promotes social efficiency.
3We also study a version of the voting procedure in which this role of Nature is removed.
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We designate the procedure V rm, a reciprocity voting procedure because Stages 2, 3, and 4
contain reciprocity clauses (or rules) that make it possible for agents to: (i) oppose actions that
are not in their interest (Stage 2); (ii) retract actions that harm others and therefore face opposition
(Stage 3); and (iii) punish actions that harm them (Stage 4). Thanks to these clauses, we show
that the voting procedure V rm induces rational agents to act in a reciprocal manner towards one
another. In addition, because we provide a non-cooperative implementation of this voting procedure
(see below), we will call it a political reciprocity mechanism.
1.2 The reciprocity set: blocking versus non-cooperative approach
We formalize the rational behavior of agents under the voting procedure V rm following both the
blocking and the non-cooperative approaches. As put by Dutta and Vohra (2017), the blocking
approach relies on a coalitional game structure to describe the feasible actions of each coalition
in the game and abstracts from the details of the negotiation process (see also Serrano (2020)),
whereas the non-cooperative bargaining approach relies on specifying details including the protocol
that describes the possible actions and order of moves of each player. Our formalization of rational
behavior under the procedure V rm takes into account the fact that agents are farsighted given the
sequential nature of this procedure.
Following the blocking approach, a policy is said to be an equilibrium if it cannot be“blocked”
by rational agents. In other words, an equilibrium policy is such that, if proposed as the status quo,
no winning coalition will have an incentive to deviate from it under the voting procedure V rm. The
reciprocity set is the set of all equilibrium policies. Following the traditional literature on coalitional
bargaining (Aumann, 1959), the reciprocity set assumes that agents are prudent or ambiguity-averse
in the face of uncertainty regarding the future of the game. When such uncertainty does not
exist (that is, Nature cannot end the voting process in Stage 1), agents can make moves that are
more strategic. This consideration leads to the sophisticated reciprocity set, a refinement of the
reciprocity set.
Following the non-cooperative approach, we formalize the voting procedure V rm as an ex-
tensive form game. We give an implementation of the sophisticated reciprocity set by showing that
a status quo policy is the unique outcome of all subgame perfect equilibria if and only if it belongs
to the sophisticated reciprocity set. We provide a similar non-cooperative implementation of the
reciprocity set.4
Furthermore, like the Nash equilibrium and the core, we show that the reciprocity set (resp.
sophisticated reciprocity set) can be defined by a domination relation, and exploit this fact to extend
these solution concepts to the class of effectivity function games, which is a very large class of games
that includes both transferable-utility games and strategic form games.5
4Various ways of implementing cooperative solution concepts have been proposed in the literature. Our imple-
mentation of the (sophisticated) reciprocity set follows a similar approach as the status quo-based implementation
provided by Lagunoff (1994) for the core.
5We find, for example, that the reciprocity set selects (Cooperate; Cooperate) as the unique equilibrium of the
two-agent Prisoners’ Dilemma Game.
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Quite interestingly, by following these different approaches, our analysis espouses the view of
scholars who argue that the boundary between the two main branches of game theory is blurry (see,
for instance, Roth and Wilson (2019), and Roth (2020)). As stated by Roth:
Today, particularly in areas of applied economics such as market design, cooperative and
noncooperative game theory are viewed more as models at different levels of detail than
as models of different kinds of games. (Roth, 2020, p. xx)
In our study, we show that these approaches are complementary. There are two main differences
between our framework and other models of political decision-making that are used in the literature:6
(i) Given that the voting procedure V rm is a sequential procedure, our framework differs from
one-shot games (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Nash, 1951; Gillies, 1959; Aumann, 1959;
Schwartz, 1976; Miller, 1980). At the same time, V rm comprises only four stages (excluding Stage
0), which can be more appropriate in a legislative context given the fact that it minimizes the
time-cost of decision-making. In fact, the voting procedure V rm is a modification of legislative
procedures that are generally employed in democratic countries like the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and many others. In these countries, legislative decision-making follows a
succession of stages. However, we show that unlike our framework, these procedures can lead to
non-Pareto-efficient policies.
(ii) By giving agents an opportunity to amend (or retract) their actions after the first move, the
reciprocity mechanism also differs from other studies on sequential multilateral bargaining (see, for
example, Harsanyi (1974), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Chwe (1994), Eguia and Shepsle (2015),
Fotso et al. (2017), and Diermeier et al. (2017)). We provide additional distinctions in Section 7.
1.3 Outline of results
Reciprocal behavior. The reciprocity mechanism V rm induces rational reciprocal behavior.
This behavior consists of avoiding actions that harm others and abstaining from free-riding, which
is positive reciprocity (Theorem 1). On the non-cooperative side, one can find a simple extensive
form game whose equilibrium prediction coincides with the sophisticated reciprocity set (Theorem
2) and the reciprocity set (Theorem 3), respectively. The latter finding implies that reciprocal and
pro-social behaviors can be induced under a non-cooperative framework among selfish agents. In
fact, the reciprocity set selects cooperation as the unique equilibrium in the prisoners’ dilemma game.
Equilibrium existence. Examining the existence of equilibria for discrete and continuous policy
spaces, we show that the reciprocity set is always nonempty if agents have strict or linear preferences
(Theorem 4 and Theorem 5). This finding implies that the reciprocity mechanism resolves the
classical paradox of voting that exists in the core. We also find that if preferences are single-peaked
over a left-right political spectrum, and if the constitution is the majority rule, there exists at least
one equilibrium policy and at most two equilibria. In particular, if the number of voters is odd, the
equilibrium is unique and it corresponds to the median voter’s ideal point (Proposition 3).
6See Section 7 and the Supplement Materials for details on such models.
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Pareto-Efficiency. One attractive property of the reciprocity set is that it only selects Pareto-
efficient policies regardless of the nature of the policy space (Theorem 6). This finding implies
that the reciprocity set, in addition to strategically preserving minority interests (Proposition 4), re-
solves the well-known conflict between individual rationality (the pursuit of self-interest) and Pareto-
efficiency (or collective rationality) in political decision making. It therefore prevents political failure
regardless of the degree to which political opinions are antagonistic.
Strategic protection of minority interests. In our treatment of minority interests, a minority
group is a losing coalition or a set of agents who, in a particular context, may favor a policy that a
majority of agents dislike. A minority option is a policy favored by a minority group. A minority option
is said to be strategic if it is majority-dominated by a policy that is also majority-dominated. We find
that a strategic minority option can be selected under the reciprocity mechanism because of agents’
farsighted behavior (Proposition 4 and Theorem 7). This property is not necessarily explained by the
fact that agents display reciprocal behavior. In fact, some of the other farsighted solution concepts
also protect strategic minority options. However, we differ in that only the reciprocity set (and
the sophisticated reciprocity set) can always protect strategic minority options while also preserving
policy efficiency. In this sense, a combination of reciprocal and farsighted behaviors leads to the
strategic protection of minorities in a way that is efficient. Also, the (sophisticated) reciprocity set
never selects non-strategic minority options. Our analysis offers a new explanation to the ”decisive
minority” phenomenon (Campbell (1999)).
Fairness and Rawlsian justice. We show that two classical concepts of distributive justice
always belong to the reciprocity set, when the latter solution concept is applied to the classical
distribution problem modeled through a transferable-utility voting game. These concepts are the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). Their goal is to distribute the
surplus generated by agents that get together to cooperate on a project. What these concepts have in
common is that they give equal pay to equally productive agents and they are Pareto-efficient. They
differ in that the Shapley value is generally viewed as reflecting meritocratic justice (see, for example,
Demeze-Jouatsa et al. (2021), and the references therein), whereas the nucleolus is considered as
a formalization of Rawlsian justice because it maximizes the payoff of least productive agents (see,
for example, Legros (1987), and Iñarra et al. (2020)). By showing that both solution concepts lead
to allocations that always belong to the reciprocity set, we show that this latter solution concept
is consistent with classical notions of distributive justice. In this respect, we differ from the core
in that it may not contain the Shapley value even when it is not empty. The core always contains
the nucleolus when it is not empty. We differ in that while the core can be empty under our mild
conditions, the reciprocity set is never empty. The sophisticated reciprocity set preserves all the
above properties (Theorem 7).
Comparison with other solution concepts. In Section 7 and the Supplemental Materials, we
compare the reciprocity mechanism to other well-known procedures (and related solution concepts)
that mainly follow the traditional blocking approach, namely the one-shot mechanism, a modified
version of the reciprocity mechanism, and several farsighted coalitional procedures. These solutions
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concepts include, among others, the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944), the Core (Gillies, 1959), the Harsanyi stable set (Harsanyi, 1974), the Top
cycle set (Schwartz, 1976), the Uncovered set (Miller, 1980), and the Largest consistent set (Chwe,
1994). We find that the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set have several comparative
advantages. For example, as mentioned above, an equilibrium policy might not exist in a one-shot
game, and farsighted coalitional procedures generally select non-Pareto-efficient policies. These two
pitfalls are avoided by the reciprocity set under mild conditions. Also, although our goal is not to
provide a systematic comparison of the different solution concepts we examine, we provide examples
in which the reciprocity set refines the predictions of some of the solution concepts developed to
capture rationality under the other procedures. Following the non-cooperative bargaining approach,
other methods in modeling strategic interactions in social environments include multilateral bar-
gaining in legislatures. Notable examples include Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Banks and Duggan
(2000), and Diermeier et al. (2017). However, our framework differs from these studies and the large
literature that they have inspired in at least three important respects that we describe in Section 7.
We strongly emphasize that the only purpose of this comparison is to show that the reciprocity set
is not a redundant solution concept. Our goal is absolutely not to highlight the relative merits of
each approach, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
In Section 2, we describe in detail the voting procedure V rm. Section 3 focuses on the equilibrium
concepts that capture strategic behavior under the procedure V rm. First, we introduce the reciprocity
set, and we show that reciprocal actions are rational. Second, we introduce the sophisticated
reciprocity set, a refinement of the reciprocity set. Third, we provide a full implementation of each
of these solution concepts, which follows a non-cooperative approach. Finally, we show that the
reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set can be generalized to the domain of effectivity
function games, which constitute a large class of games that include strategic form games. Section 4
and Section 5 study the properties of the reciprocity set. Section 6 discusses some inclusive properties
of our new equilibrium concepts under the reciprocity mechanism. In Section 7, we summarize the
comparative analyses of the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set with other solutions
that follow the blocking approach. Section 8 provides additional contributions of our study to the
literature. In Section 9, we conclude. We relegate additional elaborations on examples and the
comparative analyses of Section 7 to the Supplemental Materials.
2 Setup
2.1 Preliminary Definitions and Notations
A society denoted N , consisting of agents i = 1, ..., n, is faced with the problem of choosing a
policy from a non-empty policy space A by voting, and Θ is the set of possible states of the world.
For simplicity, we suppose that the policy space is the same in all states. We denote N as the set
of all non-empty subsets (or coalitions) of N . For any coalition S ∈ N , we use −S to denote the
5
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complement of S.
Agents hold common information, and in each state θ ∈ Θ, each agent i ∈ N has an ordinal
preference relation denoted Ri(θ) on A; the strict part of Ri(θ) is denoted by Pi(θ), and indifference
is denoted Ii(θ). The preference profile in state θ ∈ Θ is denoted R(θ) = (R1(θ), ..., Rn(θ)). Our
analysis covers weak order and linear order preferences. A preference relation Ri(θ) is a weak
ordering if it is reflexive, complete, and transitive. A linear ordering is a reflexive, anti-symmetric,
transitive, and complete binary relation. For x, y ∈ A, yRi(θ)x indicates that agent i weakly prefers
y to x; yPi(θ)x indicates that agent i prefers y to x; and yIi(θ)x indicates that agent i is indifferent
between y and x. Moreover, for S ∈ N , yPS(θ)x indicates that yPi(θ)x for each i ∈ S (we say S
prefers y over x); yRS(θ)x indicates that yPi(θ)x for some i ∈ S and yIj(θ)x for some other j ∈ S
(we say S weakly prefers y over x); and yIS(θ)x indicates that yIi(θ)x for all i ∈ S (we say S is
indifferent between y and x).
In this study, we consider both discrete and continuous policy spaces. When A is discrete, we
assume that it is finite. For a continuous policy space, we assume that A is a compact and convex
subset of a multidimensional vector space, and is endowed with the topology of closed convergence.7
When A is continuous, we also assume that preferences are continuous. Preference continuity means
that an agent who prefers a policy x over another policy y prefers any policy that is close enough
to x over any policy that is close enough to y.
A constitution is a distribution of decisive power among the different subsets of the society. It
is formalized as a function C that maps each coalition S ∈ N into either 1 or 0 (with C(∅) = 0);
C(S) = 1 means that S is a winning coalition, and C(S) = 0 means that S is a losing coalition. Let
C denote the set of all constitutions, and W (C) the set of winning coalitions under the constitution
C ∈ C. We impose the following usual conditions on W (C): (1) W (C) 6= ∅; (2) for any S, T ∈ N
such that S ⊂ T , if S ∈ W (C), then T ∈ W (C); and (3) for any S ∈ N , if S ∈ W (C), then
N −S /∈ W (C). For x, y ∈ A, we denote yP (θ)x to indicate that there exists S ∈ W (C) such that
yPS(θ)x.
8
A voting procedure, denoted V , is a description of the process governing the selection of policies.
A voting procedure that is encountered in many real-life settings is the “one-shot” procedure (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Gillies, 1959), where a challenger is pitted against a status quo,
and if supported by a winning coalition (as defined by the prevailing constitution), it replaces the
status quo, and the election process ends; otherwise, the status quo remains in place and the election
7This is a usual assumption that has proven useful in the analysis of the existence of equilibria in continuous
economies; see, for example, Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Hildenbrand (1974).
8Under a constitution, a winning coalition has the right (or power) to replace any policy x by any other policy
y and can therefore be said to detain global power. Our model easily extends to situations in which coalitions have
only local power; in such situations, a coalition might have the right to replace a policy a by a different policy b, but
might not have the right to replace c by d; an example is the election of state representatives in the United States
of America, where the residents of a state are not eligible to vote for the representatives of a different state. Such
situations can be modelled as effectivity functions (Chwe, 1994), which constitute a large class of games including
strategic form games.
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process ends.9 There exist several variants of this election format (see, among others, Schwartz
(1976), Miller (1980), Börgers (2000), and Borgers (2004)). Other real-life voting procedures are
dynamic. Under these procedures, a challenger is pitted against a status quo; if supported by a
winning coalition, it becomes the new status quo, and the process starts afresh. Some dynamic
voting procedures are designed to last only two or three rounds of vote, whereas others can go on
indefinitely and only stop when a policy is reached that no winning coalition is willing to replace.
Early contributions include, among others, Farquharson (1969), Harsanyi (1974), Rubinstein (1980),
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Chwe (1994), and Ray and Vohra (2015).
A political economy (or game) is an environment which consists of a set of agents, a policy
space, a voting procedure, a constitution, and a preference profile over the policy space. It is
formalized as a list PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V, R(θ)〉. We denote by P the set of all political economies.
2.2 A Political Economy with a Reciprocity Voting Procedure
In this study, we primarily examine political economies PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉, where the
voting procedure V rm comprises the following four stages which we describe below and represent
in Figure 1. Following the blocking approach, we primarily focus on actions that coalitions can
take or cannot take, but we do not offer details on the actions of individual agents; this is because
the blocking approach assumes that coalitions are the primary units of decision-making. However,
in Section 3.3, following the non-cooperative approach, we provide a possible description of each
agent’s action space.
Stage 0: A status quo policy x ∈ A is chosen by Nature (or by a social planner or an agent).
Stage 1 (Objection): If a winning coalition S proposes that x be replaced by another policy y,
the pair (y, S) is called a plausible objection against x. If no objection against x exists, then x
remains in place, which ends the process. If a plausible objection (y, S) against x exists, y is
recognized as a bill, and if Nature does not end the process, the voting procedure advances
to the second stage.
Stage 2 (Right to opposition): Each agent who is not a member of the sponsoring coalition S
has the right to oppose the bill y. If there is no opposition, y becomes the new policy, which
ends the process. However, if there is any opposition, the process moves to the next stage.
Stage 3 (Withdrawal): Assume there is an opposition to y. Then, S has the right to either
withdraw or maintain the bill y. If S withdraws the bill y, the status quo x remains in place
9It is important to emphasize the fact that it is the prevailing constitution that determines the set of winning
coalitions. For example, if the constitution is the majority rule, then a winning coalition is any set that contains
more than half of the voting population; if it is the unanimity rule, the unique winning coalition is the entire voting
population. Under certain constitutions such as the ones used in the United Nations Security Council, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, some voters have more power than others. Our findings hold regardless
of how the constitution is defined.
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Stages 0 and 1: Status quo and Objection by S
Stage 2: Right to opposition from N − S
Stage 3: Withdrawal from S
Stage 4: Counter-objection by T
Figure 1: Representation of the voting procedure V rm
and the process ends.10 However, if S maintains y, then the process moves to the next and
final stage, where opposing agents have a right to formulate a counter-objection.
Stage 4 (Counter-objection): Suppose that S maintains the bill y. Each opposing agent has
the right to invite other agents to form a winning coalition T (obviously the coalition T is
different from the coalition S) in order to replace y with another policy z. In this case, z is
called an amendment of y and (z, T ) is a plausible counter-objection to the objection (y, S).
If no plausible counter-objection to (y, S) exists, then y becomes the new policy, which ends
the process. If a plausible counter-objection (z, T ) exists, z is elected as the new policy and
10Recent actions by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Student and Exchange Visitor
Program (SEVP) during the peak of COVID-19 pandemic illustrate a decision-making process in which opposition
can lead to the retraction of an amendment to the status quo policy (Herpich, 2020).
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the process ends.
Three remarks are in order. First, Stages 2, 3 and 4 in the voting procedure V rm incorporate
rules or clauses of reciprocity that make it possible for agents to: (i) oppose actions that are not
in their interest (Stage 2); (ii) retract actions that face opposition because they harm others (Stage
3); and (iii) punish or retaliate against actions that are harmful (Stage 4). Indeed, we will show
that this voting procedure induces rational agents to display reciprocal actions—returning favor for
favor and harm for harm—and prevents free-riding. For this reason, we will call the mechanism that
implements the procedure V rm a reciprocity mechanism (see Section 3.3). The reciprocity clauses
in the procedure V rm distinguish it from other well-known sequential decision-making procedures in
the literature, as we discuss in Section 7 and the Supplemental Materials.
Second, note that there is no agreement that binds the members of a sponsoring coalition S.
Furthermore, if an opposition arises at Stage 2, the agents in S who want to withdraw their support
of the bill y do not need to cooperate to do so. They can withdraw in a non-cooperative manner,
and the bill will be withdrawn only if the remaining members of S who did not withdraw form a
losing coalition. Following the blocking approach, we assume that agents are self-interested, and
they join a coalition only to advance their personal interests. In addition, the voting procedure does
not give any special power or veto-right to a winning coalition to initiate the first move. Any winning
coalition can initiate the move from the status quo. Agents have full information about existing
alternatives and agents’ preferences along the process. The advantage of a first mover is its ability
to revise its move at the second stage if there is an opposition against its proposal.11
Third, the presence of Nature in the voting procedure follows the literature (see, for example,
Dubey and Shubik (1977), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), and
Acemoglu et al. (2009)) and is a realistic assumption. However, this assumption is not necessary
for our results to hold. In fact, it has been argued that many exogenous factors that are outside the
control of voters interfere with decision-making in real-life politics, and that such factors can disrupt
a process or even prevent a coalition from forming. It follows that the voting process might end
after the move from the status quo x to y initiated by a winning coalition S, even if S anticipates
that, under“normal”circumstances, there will be a subsequent move from y to z initiated by another
winning coalition T . This is because T might not be able to form due to exogenous circumstances
such as sickness of one of the members, an unanticipated change in the political atmosphere, hidden
threats directed towards certain members, etcetera. Although the presence of Nature is realistic
and affects the behavior of the sponsoring coalition S, we will show in Section 6.3 that removing
this kind of uncertainty from the process does not affect our main results.
11Note, however, that any winning coalition can move first. Therefore, the first-mover advantage does not affect
the equilibrium concepts discussed later in the paper.
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3 Equilibrium Concepts
3.1 Equilibrium Policies: The Reciprocity Set
We introduce the reciprocity set as a solution concept to determine the set of equilibrium policies–
policies that will not be replaced if proposed as status quo–under the reciprocity voting procedure
V rm described above. This solution concept therefore formalizes the rational behavior of agents by
answering the question of when a winning coalition will choose to formulate a plausible objection
against a status quo under the procedure V rm. This formalization takes into account the fact that
agents are necessarily farsighted, given the sequential nature of this voting procedure.
Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 be a political economy, x ∈ A be a status quo, and S ∈ W (C)
be a winning coalition that is deciding whether or not to replace x with another policy y. The two
following conditions should be satisfied for S to replace x by y:
1. Each member of S should prefer y over x (i.e., yPS(θ)x; y is said to be majority-preferred to
x); and
2. For any winning coalition T different from S that prefers an alternative policy z over y
(i.e., zPT (θ)y), if some member of T prefers the status quo x over the proposed policy y (i.e.,
not(yRT (θ)x)), then each member of S should weakly prefer z over x (i.e., zRS(θ)x). More
formally, this condition is expressed as follows:
[∀(z, T ) ∈ A×W (C), S 6= T, zPT (θ)y and not(yRT (θ)x)] implies [zRS(θ)x].
The first condition is a natural requirement that appears in all two-stage bargaining models of
rationality in the literature (see, for example, Aumann and Maschler (1964), Mas-Colell (1989), and
all of the subsequent studies inspired by this paper). This condition can be viewed as an expression
of prudence or ambiguity aversion. It expresses the fact that the sponsoring coalition S considers
the presence of Nature in the voting procedure and therefore cannot fully predict the future of
the game after introducing the bill y. This is because the game might end at y for the reasons
mentioned earlier. Therefore, even if each member of S knows that there exists another winning
coalition T that will be interested in deviating from the proposed policy y to a more preferred policy
z and even if z is not an inferior option for S than x, it is not clear that T will be formed. It follows
that y might end up being selected, with the implication that S cannot introduce option y without
preferring it over the policy x.12
12Interestingly, a reader has also mentioned that this assumption can be interpreted as an expression of bounded
rationality. Such assumptions are often made for realistic reasons. For instance, Demuynck et al. argue that myopic
moves are “...natural in complex social environments where the number of possible states is large and agents have
little information about the possible actions other agents may take or the incentives of other agents.”Demuynck et al.
(2019, p. 2). See also Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for similar arguments in the context of network formation. In
Section 6.3, we propose the sophisticated reciprocity set—a refinement of the reciprocity set that captures strategic
behavior in the absence of Nature and therefore gets rid of the first condition above—, and we show that it preserves
all the properties of the reciprocity set.
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The second condition says that, if, following a plausible objection (y, S) against the status quo
x, a winning coalition T formulates a plausible counter-objection or an amendment (z, T ), then S
should weakly prefer z over x provided that certain members of T prefer x over y. In fact, it is
straightforward to see that if all of the members of T prefer y over x (i.e., yRT (θ)x) and if some
member of S prefer x over z, then the coalition T will not oppose the move from x to y and so will
not formulate the plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against (y, S). Indeed, if T opposes y, then S
will withdraw its plausible objection, thus resulting in x remaining in place, an outcome that does
not benefit the members of T since they all prefer y over x. This means that an opposition leading
to a plausible counter-objection (z, T ) emerges if and only if T prefers z over y (i.e., zPT (θ)y) and
there is at least one member of T who prefers x over y (i.e., not(yRT (θ)x)).
The reciprocity set is the set of all the equilibrium policies, with an equilibrium policy being a
policy that cannot be replaced if it is a status quo under the voting procedure V rm. We define it
formally below.
Definition 1. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 be a political economy, S ∈ W (C) be a winning
coalition, and x, y ∈ A be two policies.
1. Plausible objection: (y, S) is said to be a plausible objection against x if yPS(θ)x.
2. Plausible counter-objection: Let (y, S) be a plausible objection against x. A pair (z, T ) ∈
A×W (C) is said to be a plausible counter-objection against (y, S) if zPT (θ)y and not(yRT (θ)x).
3. Unfriendly plausible counter-objection: Let (y, S) be a plausible objection against x and
(z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C) be a plausible counter-objection against (y, S). The plausible counter-
objection (z, T ) is said to be unfriendly if not(zRS(θ)x).
13
4. Justified plausible objection: A plausible objection (y, S) against x is said to be justified if
there is no unfriendly plausible counter-objection against (y, S). If (y, S) is a justified plausible
objection against x, this is denoted by y mS x.
5. Reciprocity set: The reciprocity set of PE(θ), denoted E(PE(θ)), is the set of all the policies
in A against which no justified plausible objection exists. Formally, given a state θ ∈ Θ,
E(PE(θ)) = {x ∈ A : there does not exist (y, S) ∈ A×W (C) such that y mS x}.
Any policy in the reciprocity set is called a reciprocity equilibrium.14
13The notion of an “unfriendly counter-objection” is inspired by the concept of an “unfriendly amendment” found
in the legislative jargon.
14Note that, in our framework, plausible objections and plausible counter-objections are formulated in terms of
strict domination (yPSx if yPix for each i ∈ S). All of the results of this paper continue to hold if we use weak
domination (yPSx if yRix for each i ∈ S and yPjx for some j ∈ S) instead, though the reciprocity set could be
refined.
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In a political economy, all agents bargain and settle on an equilibrium policy that emerges from
the sequence of threats and counter-threats. The emergence of a policy as equilibrium, in general,
reflects the power or influence of different population coalitions as well as the preferences of agents.
In our framework, this power is provided by the constitution C. The reciprocity set derives its name
from the fact that it captures strategic behavior under the reciprocity voting procedure V rm. As
we also show in Section 3.1.1 below, reciprocal actions—returning favor for favor and harm for
harm–are rational under the procedure V rm.
Interestingly, the reciprocity set defines a social choice correspondence E, which maps any po-
litical economy PE(θ) ∈ P to the subset E(PE(θ)) ⊆ A, the set of equilibrium policies in state
θ ∈ Θ. One important property of the function E is Pareto-efficiency, i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ, and all
x ∈ E(PE(θ)), x is (weakly) Pareto-efficient: there is no y ∈ A such that yPi(θ)x for all i ∈ N .
In Section 5, we show that E satisfies Pareto-efficiency when the domain of preferences for each
agent consists of strict or weak ordering over discrete or continuous policy spaces.
3.1.1 Reciprocal Actions are Rational under the Voting Procedure V rm
We show that the voting procedure V rm provides incentives for agents to take reciprocal actions,
regardless of whether agents are selfish or not. The procedure encourages the phenomenon known
as positive reciprocity—returning favor for favor—, and it prevents the emergence of negative reci-
procity—returning harm for harm—. Indeed, we prove in Theorem 1 below that the following
statements are all true:
1. A first-mover coalition S cannot rationally take any action that harms the interests of any
potential second-mover coalition T , unless it is the case that no member of S will be worse
off after the subsequent move by T (see item (1) of Theorem 1).
2. Similarly, no second-mover coalition T can rationally take an action that harms the interests
of a first-mover coalition S (see item (2) of Theorem 1).
3. As a consequence of 1. and 2., if the move of a first-mover coalition S does not hurt any
member of a potential second mover T , then S will effectively initiate the move, even if T
would like to initiate a subsequent move to a policy z at which some members of S are worse
off relative to the status quo (see item (3) of Theorem 1).
Theorem 1. (Reciprocal actions are rational) Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 be a political
economy. For all S, T ∈ W (C) and distinct policies x, y, z ∈ A such that yPS(θ)x and zPT (θ)y:
1. If not(yRT (θ)x) (that is, if a move from the status quo x to y will hurt some member of T ),
then S will not formulate any plausible objection (y, S) against x, unless zRS(θ)x (that is,
unless no member of S will be hurt at z relative to x after T deviates from y to z following
the move from x to y by S). If not(yRT (θ)x) and not(zRS(θ)x), then S will not formulate
a plausible objection (y, S) against x.
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2. Assume that S formulates a plausible objection (y, S) against x. If the move from x to y
does not hurt any member of T (yRT (θ)x), then T will not formulate an unfriendly plausible
counter-objection (z, T ) against (y, S) following an opposition.
3. As a corollary of items 1. and 2., if yRT (θ)x, then S will formulate a plausible objection (y, S)
against x, even if not(zRS(θ)x).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let S, T ∈ W (C), and x, y, z ∈ A such that yPS(θ)x and zPT (θ)y.
1. Suppose that not(yRT (θ)x) and not(zRS(θ)x). Assume by contradiction that S formulates
a plausible objection (y, S) against x. Then, since zPT (θ)y, a member of T who is not a member
of S will oppose the plausible objection. Hence, S will either withdraw or maintain its plausible
objection following the prescription in Stage 2. Clearly, S will withdraw its plausible objection since,
if it does not this, a plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against (y, S) will be formulated by T , thus
leading to z being selected as the new policy. This is an inferior outcome for some members of
S because not(zRS(θ)x). It follows that x will remain in place, which implies that formulating a
plausible objection (y, S) against x will not profit S. The coalition S will therefore not formulate
such an plausible objection, which is a contradiction.
2. Assume that S formulates a plausible objection (y, S) against x, and suppose that yRT (θ)x.
Assume by contradiction that a member of T who is not a member of S opposes this move.
Then, S will either withdraw or maintain its plausible objection. Given the fact that the plausible
counter-objection (z, T ) is a possibility if S does not withdraw y and is an unfriendly plausible
counter-objection by definition (since not(zRS(θ)x)), S will withdraw its plausible objection, thus
causing x to remain in place. But this does not benefit coalition T , since yRT (θ)x. Consequently,
T will not formulate any unfriendly plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against (y, S), which is a
contradiction.
3. Assume that yRT (θ)x. If S formulates a plausible objection (y, S) against x, there will be no
opposition that could lead to an unfriendly plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against (y, S). This
occurs because such an opposition will lead to S withdrawing its plausible objection and thus causing
the election of x. This response will not benefit the members of coalition T . Then, following the
plausible objection, either y will be elected if there is opposition or any opposition and subsequent
plausible counter-objection (z, T ) will be such that zRS(θ)x. In either case, S will benefit, thus
justifying its objection (y, S) against option x.
It follows from Theorem 1 that the voting procedure V rm encourages positive reciprocity and
prevents negative reciprocity from emerging in that it discourages first movers from taking actions
that will trigger retaliation by second movers. It can be seen that reciprocal actions are induced by
the possibility for a first-mover coalition to withdraw its move if an opposition arises (Stage 2 in
V rm) and by the possibility for any second-mover coalition to retaliate against any first move that
is harmful.
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3.2 A Refinement: The Sophisticated Reciprocity Set
The reciprocity set assumes that each member of a winning coalition S that formulates a plausible
objection (y, S) to a status quo policy x should prefer y to x. As acknowledged earlier, this
assumption, which goes back to Aumann and Maschler (1964) and Selten (1981), can be viewed
as formalizing a prudent behavior or an aversion to ambiguity when there is uncertainty regarding
the continuation of the voting process after the first stage. In this section, we assume that such
uncertainty does not exist, implying that agents can act more strategically. Therefore, for θ ∈ Θ,
we denote a political economy PEs(θ) as an array 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉, where V s is the voting
procedure V rm without the intervention of Nature. More precisely, the description of the procedure
V s is exactly as that of the procedure V rm, except for Stage 1 of V rm which is modified as follows:
Stage 1 (Objection): If a winning coalition S proposes that x be replaced by another policy y,
the pair (y, S) is called a plausible objection against x. If no objection against x exists, then
x remains in place, which ends the process. If a plausible objection (y, S) against x exists, y
is recognized as a bill.
Under the voting procedure V s, we modify the definition of a“plausible objection”in the definition
of the reciprocity set. This modification leads to a new solution concept that we call the sophisticated
reciprocity set. We will show that this new solution concept refines the reciprocity set while also
preserving all its properties.
To define the sophisticated reciprocity set, we now assume that a coalition may sponsor a move
from a status quo policy x to a policy y even if its members do not prefer y to x. The move would
be rational only if the members of the sponsoring coalition know that the voting process will move
from y to an alternative z at which they are better off compared to x. More generally, a winning
coalition S that wishes to replace a status quo x with a policy y should prefer y to x only if the
vote process will not move beyond y, which will happen under two different circumstances. The
first is that there is no other winning coalition T that has an incentive to formulate a plausible
counter-objection (z, T ) (that is, not(zRT (θ)y) for any T ∈ W (C), T 6= S, z ∈ A). The second
scenario is that if such a coalition T exists, T must not be hurt by the move from x to y (i.e.,
yRT (θ)x) and S must be hurt by z relative x (i.e., not(zRS(θ)x)). In this latter circumstance, no
member of T will oppose the move from x to y by S because doing so will cause S to withdraw y
under the reciprocity voting procedure V s, which will hurt T . This reasoning is formalized in the
definition of a“strategic objection”in Definition 2 below. The sophisticated reciprocity set is defined
simply by replacing the notion of a plausible objection in the definition of the reciprocity set (see
Definition 1) by the notion of a strategic objection.
Definition 2. Let PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉 be a political economy, S be a winning coalition,
and x, y ∈ A be two policies.
1. Strategic objection: (y, S) is said to be a strategic objection against x if for all (z, T ) ∈
A×W (C), S 6= T , [yRT (θ)x and not(zRS(θ)x)] or not(zRT (θ)y) implies yPS(θ)x.
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2. Plausible counter-objection: Let (y, S) be a strategic objection against x. A pair (z, T ) ∈
A×W (C), S 6= T , is said to be a counter-objection against (y, S) if zPT (θ)y and not(yRT (θ)x).
3. Unfriendly plausible counter-objection: Let (y, S) be a strategic objection against x and
(z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C) be a counter-objection against (y, S). The counter-objection (z, T ) is
said to be unfriendly if not(zRS(θ)x).
4. Justified strategic objection: A strategic objection (y, S) against x is said to be justified if
there is no unfriendly counter-objection against (y, S). If (y, S) is a justified strategic objection
against x, this is denoted by y msdS x.
5. Sophisticated reciprocity set: The sophisticated reciprocity set of PEs(θ), denoted SR(PEs(θ)),
is the set of all the policies in A against which no justified strategic objection exists. Formally,
SR(PEs(θ)) = {x ∈ A : there does not exist (y, S) ∈ A×W (C) such that y msdS x}.
Any policy in SR(PEs(θ)) is called a sophisticated reciprocity equilibrium.
Example 1 illustrates the difference between the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity
set.
Example 1. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 and PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉 be two po-
litical economies, where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, A = {x, y, z, t}, the constitution C is majority
rule, and the preference profile R(θ) over the set A is defined as follows: yP1(θ)tP1(θ)zP1(θ)x;
yP2(θ)tP2(θ)zP2(θ)x; zP3(θ)yP3(θ)xP3(θ)t; tI4(θ)zP4(θ)xP4(θ)y; xP5(θ)tP5(θ)zP5(θ)y; and






Figure 2: Reciprocity set versus Sophisticated reciprocity set
Figure 2 describes the domination or popularity graph among policies according to agent prefer-
ences. The reciprocity set E(PE(θ)) set is larger than the sophisticated reciprocity set SR(PEs(θ)):
E(PE(θ)) = {x, y, t} and SR(PEs(θ)) = {y, t}. It is straightforward to see that if x is the status
quo, it will not be replaced by any winning coalition if agents behave according to the rationality
defining the reciprocity set. However, the winning coalition S will replace x by y if agents behave
according to the sophisticated reciprocity set. This is because, despite the fact that S does not
prefer y to x, its members know that if they move to y, player 5 will oppose the move, and will
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subsequently form the winning coalition T to move to z, which is a better outcome for S relative
to x.15
In Proposition 1, we show that the sophisticated reciprocity set refines the reciprocity set.
Proposition 1. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 and PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉 be two
political economies. Then, SR(PEs(θ)) ⊆ E(PE(θ)), and this inclusion may be strict.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let x, y ∈ A be two policies, and S ∈ W (C) be a winning coalition. We
note that y msdS x if and only if: a) ∀(z, T ) ∈ A×W (C), S 6= T , [yRT (θ)x and not(zRS(θ)x)] or
not(zRT (θ)y) implies yPS(θ)x; and, b) [∀(z, T ) ∈ A×W (C), S 6= T, zPT (θ)y and not(yRT (θ)x)]
implies [zRS(θ)x]. Let x ∈ SR(PEs(θ)). Assume that x /∈ E(PE(θ)). Then, there exists (y, S) ∈
A ×W (C) such that y mS x. It is straightforward to prove that y msdS x, which is a contradiction.
Then, SR(PEs(θ)) ⊆ E(PE(θ)). In Example 1, we provide two political economies PEs(θ) and
PE(θ) such that SR(PEs(θ)) = {y, t} 6= {x, y, t} = E(PE(θ)).
3.3 A Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Reciprocity Set and the
Sophisticated Reciprocity Set
In this section, we provide a non-cooperative implementation of the reciprocity set and the sophisti-
cated reciprocity. The implementation of the reciprocity set presents a difficulty inherent to the role
played by Nature in Stage 1 of the voting procedure V rm. For this reason, we will start with the
complete implementation of the sophisticated reciprocity set.16 A complete implementation of the
reciprocity set will follow by assuming that agents solve the ambiguity caused by Nature in Stage 1
of V rm by adopting a “maxmin” behavior. Following this behavior, agents in Stage 1 of V rm vote
against a status quo x for a challenger y only if they will not regret this move in the worse case
scenario: if Nature ends the game after this move, then y will prevail, otherwise, another policy z
will prevail; a“maxmin”behavior implies that an agent who votes for y against x should prefer their
least preferred option between y and z to x.
3.3.1 A Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Sophisticated Reciprocity Set
We assume that there is a designer who knows all the components of a political economy except the
preference profile R(θ), given θ ∈ Θ. Their goal is to implement the social choice correspondence
SR. In the spirit of Lagunoff (1994) who develops a class of sequential voting mechanisms that
are relative to a“status quo”outcome for the implementation of the core (Edgeworth, 1881; Gillies,
1959), we define a class of (extensive form) mechanisms for the implementation of the sophisticated
reciprocity set. Each of these mechanisms can be roughly described as follows. Nature chooses at
15Note that following the opposition by agent 5, the coalition S will not withdraw y, giving the opportunity to 5
to form T and move from y to z, ending the game according to the voting procedure V rm.
16Remark that given that the sophisticated reciprocity set is included in the reciprocity set, a complete implemen-
tation of the former is a partial implementation of the latter.
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random a “status quo” policy that will be either adopted or rejected following a sequential voting
procedure of perfect information described below. Under this procedure, each agent moves sequen-
tially according to a predetermined and known protocol. In this sequential game, a move will consist
of proposing an amendment to the status quo, or opposing or accepting a proposal introduced by
another agent, or withdrawing their support from a previous move following the predetermined order.
This procedure is a fully described below.
An extensive form game or mechanism is an array Γ = 〈N,A, x, C, K, φ, g〉, where N is a set
of agents, A the policy space, x ∈ A a status quo policy, C the constitution, K the game tree with
initial node x (the status quo policy), φ a protocol that determines the order of agents’ moves in the
tree, and g : Z × {C} × {x} −→ A is the outcome function, where Z denotes the set of terminal
nodes of the tree K. The set of nodes (or steps) of the tree K is denoted T. For all t ∈ T − Z,
agents move according to the protocol φ. Let Φ be the set of all protocols φ that determine the
order in which agents move. Let M ti denote the set of actions available to agent i at node t and let
Mi denote the set of strategies of agent i. The set of strategy profiles is denoted by M = ×ni=1Mi.
For a strategy profile m ∈M , let g(m, C, x, t) or simply g(m,x, t) (given that C is fixed) denote the
policy corresponding to m starting at node t ∈ T − Z; when t ∈ Z, we simply write g(m, C, x, t)
as g(m,x). For a profile m = (mi)i∈N ∈ M , we denote m−S = (mi)i/∈S, for S ∈ N . Given a
political economy PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉, the mechanism Γ defines an extensive form game
G = 〈Γ, R(θ)〉, where agents evaluate their payoffs corresponding to each strategy profile m at the
policy g(m,x). We denote by F(x, θ) the class of all extensive form games attained by varying the
protocol φ. That is, F(x, θ) = {G = 〈N,A, x,K, φ, C, g, R(θ)〉 : φ ∈ Φ}.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of a game G is a strategy profile m̂ ∈M such that for all t ∈ T
and for all i ∈ N ,
g(m̂, x, t) Ri(θ) g(m̂−i,mi, x, t) for all mi ∈Mi.
Let SPE(G) denote the set of all policies corresponding to (or selected by) subgame perfect equilibria
of the extensive form game G.




























Figure 3: Illustration of the extensive form mechanism. Note: Re = recognition; V = vote; O =
opposition; Wv = withdrawal vote.
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Step 1. The first agent in the order determined by the protocol φ ∈ Φ makes a proposal y against
the status quo x, and each of the other agents chooses the inactive action denoted ∅. If the
first agent does not propose a policy y 6= x, the second agent in the protocol φ is asked to
propose, and so on. If no agent proposes y 6= x, the process ends. Otherwise, the game
moves to the next step.
Step 2. All agents vote sequentially according to the protocol φ between y and x. Each agent
has two possible actions: vote “yes” (supports y) or vote “no” (supports x). Let S be the set
of agents who support y against x. If S is a winning coalition (i.e., S ∈ W (C)), the vote
passes, y is recognized as a bill, and the game advances to Step 3. Otherwise, the status quo
x remains in place (that is, S is not a winning coalition or S /∈ W (C)), and the game ends.
Step 3. The alternative y is on the floor. Each agent i who is not a member of the set S can
oppose the bill y. Agent i ∈ N − S has two actions: vote “yes” (oppose y) or “no” ( not
oppose y). Implicitly, agents in S do not oppose y; in that case, we assume that each agent
in S chooses the inactive action ∅. All agents in N − S vote, sequentially, according to φ. If
all agents vote“no”(not oppose y), then y is selected and the game ends. Otherwise, at least
an agent in N − S votes “yes” (oppose y) and the vote continues to Step 4.
Step 4. Agents in Step 1 who voted “yes” for y (the coalition S) decide to either withdraw or
maintain their support for y. Each agent in S has two actions: vote “yes” (maintains) or “no”
(withdraws); and each agent i ∈ N − S chooses the inactive action ∅. All agents in S vote,
sequentially, according to the protocol φ. If the set of agents who vote “no” is such that the
remaining agents of S who voted “yes” still form a winning coalition, y is maintained and the
game continues to Step 5. Otherwise, the bill y is withdrawn, the status quo x remains in
place, and the game ends.
Step 5. The alternative y is on the floor. The first agent (agent i) among the opponents of y in
Step 3 (N − S), according to the protocol φ, proposes an alternative zi 6= y, and each of the
other agents chooses the inactive action ∅.
Step 6. All agents vote, sequentially, according to φ. Each agent has two actions: vote “yes”
(supports zi) or “no” (supports y). Let Ti be the set of agents who support zi against y. If
Ti is a winning coalition, then zi is the chosen policy and the game ends. Otherwise, the first
agent (agent i + 1) among the remaining opponents of y in N − S − {i}, according to the
protocol φ, proposes another alternative zi+1 /∈ {y, zi}, and all agents vote according to φ.
If zi+1 is supported by a winning coalition Ti+1 against y, zi+1 is the chosen policy and the
game ends. Otherwise, the first agent (agent i+ 2) of y in N −S−{i, i+ 1}, according to φ
proposes zi+2 /∈ {y, zi, zi+1}, and all agents vote according to φ. The process continues and
ends when either a policy zj proposed by an opponent j ∈ N − S is majority-preferred to y
or y is not beaten by any of the policies zj proposed by the opponents of y in N − S. In the
latter case, y is the chosen policy and the game ends.
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When the voting process ends in a given step, agents receive their “utilities” according to the
selected policy and their preferences R(θ). In the mechanism, agents are recognized according to
the protocol φ, and when it is time to vote, every agent observes the vote as it is cast. Therefore,
agents are perfectly informed about the entire history of play whenever they must take an action.
Let T be the set of steps or nodes in our extensive form mechanism. Let hti be the history of moves
in the game that contains the identity of proposers, proposals that have been made, and actions
taken up to node t ∈ T, but not including agent i. We can assume that the history at t = 0 before
the agents move (according to φ) in Step 1 is the empty history: hi(0) = ∅ for each i ∈ N . At
history hit, t ∈ T, agent i takes action ati such that
ati ∈
A if agent i is the proposer,{yes, no, ∅} Otherwise.






i−1). A strategy for agent i is a mapping mi which maps
histories hti to actions a
t
i for all t ∈ T. A strategy profile m = (m1, ...,mn) describes a complete
sequence of moves in the game given the status quo policy x. This completes the description of
the extensive form game. Theorem 2 shows that the sophisticated reciprocity set admits a non-
cooperative implementation in the domain F .
Theorem 2. Let PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉 ∈ P be a political economy and x ∈ A be a policy,
(1) if x ∈ SR(PE(θ)) then SPE(G) = {x} for every G ∈ F(x, θ);
(2) if x ∈ SPE(G) for some G ∈ F(x, θ), then x ∈ SR(PE(θ)).
Theorem 2 shows that equilibrium policies under the reciprocity set are those status quo policies
that prevail in all extensive form games in the domain F . By contrast a policy that is not in the
reciprocity set can not prevail if proposed as a status quo in any such extensive form game in the
domain F .
Proof of Theorem 2. We need some additional notation before proving Theorem 2. Let x ∈ A
be the status quo and G = 〈N,A, x,K, φ, C, g, R(θ)〉 ∈ F(x, θ) be an extensive form game. Let
Ω = A×W (C)×N ×N × A, and (y, S, i, T, z) be an element of Ω, with i ∈ T − S, and y 6= x.
Let Ex(y, S, i, T, z) denote a possible sequence of moves in the game G (given the status quo x;
an agent is recognized and proposes y; S ∈ W (C) consists of agents who vote to support y against
x, i.e, yPS(θ)x; agent i /∈ S opposes y; the bill y is not withdrawn; and agents form T ∈ N to
support z against y, i.e., zPT (θ)y). A strategy profile m in the game G which corresponds to a
sequence Ex(y, S, i, T, z) leads to either y or z as the final policy, i.e., g(m,x) ∈ {y, z}; however if
T ∈ W (C), then g(m,x) = z.
(1) Let PEs(θ) be a political economy. Consider G ∈ F(x, θ) and assume that x ∈ SR(Ps(θ)).
We show that x ∈ SPE(G). Suppose that x /∈ SPE(G). Then, any strategy profile m̂ ∈M which is
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G does not yield x as the final policy, i.e., g(m̂, x) 6= x.
Let m̂ be such a strategy profile. Then, there exists an element (y, S, i, T, z) ∈ Ω such that the
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sequence of moves Ex(y, S, i, T, z) generated from m̂ leads to either y or z as the final policy,
i.e., g(m̂, x) ∈ {y, z}. We discuss two points. (a) Assume that [yRT (θ)x and not(zRS(θ)x)]
and T ∈ W (C). Given that yPS(θ)x, then the pair (y, S) is a strategic objection against x, and
g(m̂, x) = z. Note that (z, T ) cannot be a plausible counter-objection against (y, S) since yRT (θ)x.
Let (z′, T ′) ∈ A×W (C) be a plausible counter-objection against (y, S), with z′ 6= z and z′RS(θ)x.
Then, there exists j ∈ T ′ − S such that xPj(θ)y and z′PT ′(θ)y. Let m be a strategy profile in the
game G that yields the sequence of moves Ex(y, S, j, T ′, z′). Given that z′PT ′(θ)y and T
′ ∈ W (C),
it holds that g(m,x) = z′. With z′RS(θ)x, it follows that the plausible counter-objection (z
′, T ′)
against (y, S) is friendly, and (y, S) is a justified strategic objection against x. (b) If not(zRT ′(θ)y)
for any T ′ ∈ W (C), including T ′ = T , then, with yPS(θ)x, the pair (y, S) is a justified strategic
objection against x. Points (a) and (b) imply that x /∈ SR(PEs(θ)), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, x ∈ SPE(G).
Now, for a game G ∈ F(x, θ), assume there exists y ∈ SPE(G) such that y 6= x. Then,
there exists a strategy profile m̂ ∈ M which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G with
g(m̂, x) = y. According to the game G, there exists S ∈ W (C) such that yPS(θ)x. If there is no
(z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C) such that zPT (θ)y, then (y, S) is a justified plausible objection against x or
x /∈ SR(PEs(θ)), which is a contradiction. Assume there exist (z, T ) ∈ A− {y} ×W (C), T 6= S,
T∩(N−S) 6= ∅, and zPT (θ)y. Let i ∈ T∩(N−S) and consider the strategy profile m = (m̂−i,mi),
where agent i opposes y in Step 3, and if recognized in Step 5 or Step 6, proposes z and votes for
z against y, and keeps all other actions according to m̂i. Given that T ∈ W (C), g(m) = z and
ziPi(θ)y, which is a contradiction, since y ∈ SPE(G). Therefore, y = x, and SPE(G) = {x} for
every G ∈ F(x, θ).
(2) Let x /∈ SR(PEs(θ)) and G ∈ F(x, θ). There exist y ∈ A− {x} and S ∈ W (C) such that
(y, S) is a justified strategic objection against x. Assume that x is the final policy supported by the
subgame perfect equilibrium profile m̂ = (m̂1, ..., m̂n) ∈M : g(m̂, x) = x.
a) Assume there is no plausible counter-objection against y. Let a1 be the first agent in S
according to the protocol φ. By definition, m̂a1 is a best response given any history h
t
a1
, t ∈ T.
Consider the deviation in which agent a1 proposes y in Step 1. There are only two scenarios that
could yield x as the final policy from this deviation.
Case (a-1). The vote in Step 2 favors x against y.
Case (a-2). The vote in Step 2 favors y against x; an agent i ∈ N − S opposes policy y; and
members in S fail to maintain y.
Consider Case (a-1). Given that (y, S) is a strategic objection against x, it holds that yPS(θ)x.
The vote in Step 2 favors x against y implies that there exists T ∈ W (C) such that xPT (θ)y and
not(yRT (θ)x). The latter implies that (x, T ) is a plausible counter-objection against y, which is
absurd by assumption. Additionally, since S and T ∈ W (C), there exists i ∈ S ∩ T such that
xPi(θ)yPi(θ)x or xPi(θ)x by transitivity of P (θ), which is a contradiction. Consider Case (a-2).
Here, as in Case (a-1), the best response for each agent in S is to vote “yes” and not oppose policy
y. Therefore, x cannot arise as the final policy of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G.
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b) Assume that there exists a plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against the strategic objection
(y, S). Thus, there exists i ∈ T − S such that xPi(θ)y, and zPT (θ)y. Given that the strategic
objection (y, S) is justified, then zRS(θ)x. Following the same reasoning in as in Case a), a subgame
perfect equilibrium in the game G can yield only z as the final policy, which is a contradiction.
3.3.2 A Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Reciprocity Set
In Section 3.3.2, we provide a non-cooperative implementation of the reciprocity set. For simplicity,
we will assume that agents have linear preferences. The mechanism that implements this solution
concept, denoted as ΓNa, is described exactly in the same way as the mechanism, Γ, that implements
the sophisticated reciprocity set, except for a small modification in Step 2 of the extensive form game
G = 〈Γ, R(θ)〉, which is modified as follows:
Step 2. All agents vote sequentially according to an exogenous protocol φ between y and x. Each
agent has two possible actions: vote “yes” (supports y) or vote “no” (supports x). Let S be
the set of agents who support y against x. If S is a winning coalition, the vote passes, y is
recognized as a bill, and if Nature does not end the voting process, the game advances
to Step 3 below. Otherwise, the status quo x remains in place (that is, S is not a winning
































Figure 4: Illustration of the extensive form mechanism. Note: Re = recognition; V = vote; Na =
Nature; O = opposition; Wv = withdrawal vote.
The game tree resulting from this modification is presented in Figure 4. Given a political economy
PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉, the mechanism ΓNa defines an extensive form game with Nature,
that we denote GNa = 〈ΓNa, R(θ)〉, where agents evaluate their payoffs corresponding to each
strategy profile m at the policy g(m,x) as described in Section 3.3.1. We denote by FNa(x, θ) the
class of all extensive form games attained by varying the protocol φ. That is, FNa(x, θ) = {G =
〈ΓNa, R(θ)〉 : φ ∈ Φ}. For simplicity, for any game with Nature GNa = 〈ΓNa, R(θ)〉 ∈ FNa(x, θ),
we write G = 〈Γ, R(θ)〉 ∈ F(x, θ) the corresponding game without Nature.
17Nature ends the game with an unknown probability strictly greater than 0.
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It follows that Nature creates an uncertainty regarding the continuation of the game process after
the move from the status quo. We assume that the social planner perceives ambiguity in voters’
preferences and behavior, which is a natural assumption. More precisely, we assume that agents
adopt a maxmin behavior which consists of voting against a status quo x for a challenger y only if they
will not regret it regardless of whether Nature ends the game process at y (in case those who vote for
y form a winning coalition) or not. Assume that agents who vote for y against the status quo x form
a winning coalition S. If Nature ends the game after the move from x to y, y will prevail. Otherwise,
another policy z will prevail. A maxmin behavior in any equilibrium play in a game GNa implies that
for agent i in S, mini {y, z}Ri(θ)x, where mini {y, z} is the least preferred policy between y and z
from voter i’s point of view. Taking this ambiguity aversion into account in an equilibrium play, we
define an equilibrium in this uncertain environment as a strategy vector that is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the corresponding extensive form game G = 〈Γ, R(θ)〉 ∈ F(x, θ), where Nature
cannot end the game, and that respects the property according to which mini {y, z}Ri(θ)x for each
agent i in the sponsoring coalition S. If we take this latter property as a“constraint”, then we obtain
an equilibrium notion that appropriately captures strategic behavior in our uncertain environment.
We will call that notion a constrained subgame perfect equilibrium. Formally, a strategy profile
m̂ ∈M is a constrained subgame perfect equilibrium of the game GNa ∈ FNa(x, θ) if:
(a) m̂ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G = 〈Γ, R(θ)〉 ∈ F(x, θ); and
(b) mini {g(m̂, x), y}Ri(θ)x for all i ∈ S, where S consists of agents who vote for y against x in
m̂, and g(m̂, x) ∈ A is a policy selected by m̂.
Let SPE(GNa) denote the set of all policies selected by constrained subgame perfect equilibria of the
extensive form game GNa. Theorem 3 shows that the mechanism ΓNa implements the reciprocity
set the in the domain FNa.
Theorem 3. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 ∈ P be a political economy and x ∈ A be a policy,
(1) if x ∈ E(PE(θ)) then SPE(GNa) = {x} for every GNa ∈ FNa(x, θ);
(2) if x ∈ SPE(GNa) for some GNa ∈ FNa(x, θ), then x ∈ E(PE(θ)).
The proof of Theorem 3 uses the same arguments as that of Theorem 2 and is presented in
Supplement Materials (Section 1).
The general problem of implementing social choice correspondences through non-cooperative
solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium has been extensively
analyzed. Canonical mechanisms include, among others, Maskin (1977) and Jackson (1992) and
Dutta et al. (1994) for Nash implementation (see also Dasgupta et al. (1979), Maskin (1985), Moore
(1992), and Jackson (2001) for excellent surveys); Selten (1981), Moore and Repullo (1988) and
Abreu and Sen (1990) for subgame perfect implementation. Some works on the implementation
of the core include, among others, Kalai et al. (1979), Lagunoff (1994), Moldovanu and Winter
(1994), Perry and Reny (1994), Serrano (1995), Serrano and Vohra (1997), Bergin and Duggan
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(1999), Banks and Duggan (2000), and Okada (2012). Gul (1989) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)
implement the Shapley value; Harsanyi (1974) implements the stable sets; Einy and Wettstein
(1999) and Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2000) consider the implementation of bargaining sets;
and Serrano (1993) implements the Nucleolus. We view the implementation-theoretic approaches
in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 as providing a non-cooperative underpinning of the sophisticated set and
the reciprocity set, respectively.
3.3.3 The Predicted (Sophisticated) Reciprocity Set
The non-cooperative implementation of the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity suggests
that one can predict the outcome of vote from any status quo policy. If a policy is in the reciprocity
set (resp. sophisticated reciprocity set), by definition, that policy will be selected if proposed as the
status quo under the voting procedure V rm (resp. V s). Otherwise, it will be replaced by another
policy. In this section, we introduce the predicted reciprocity set (resp. sophisticated reciprocity set)
as a solution concept that determines the set of policies that can be selected from a given status
quo under the voting procedure V rm (resp. V s). This solution concept is intuitively similar to that
of the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 (resp. PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉) be a political econ-
omy, and x ∈ A be a status quo. If x is not a reciprocity equilibrium (sophisticated reciprocity
equilibrium), there exists a justified plausible objection (resp. strategic objection) (y, S) against x.
If there is no opposition or plausible counter-objection against y, y will be the predicted outcome
at x. If there is any opposition and, in particular, if there is a plausible counter-objection against y
that leads to the proposition of amendment z, then z will be the predicted outcome at x. Indeed,
given the fact that (y, S) is a justified plausible objection (resp. strategic objection) against x, the
latter plausible counter-objection is not unfriendly to the coalition (i.e., S) supporting the plausible
objection (resp. strategic objection). The precise description of the predicted reciprocity set (resp.
sophisticated reciprocity set) is provided in Definition 3.
Definition 3. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, V rm, C, R(θ)〉 (resp. PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉) be a
political economy and x ∈ A be a status quo. The predicted reciprocity set (resp. predicted
sophisticated reciprocity set) at x, denoted Ex(PE(θ)) (resp. SRx(PEs(θ))), is defined as follows:
Ex(PE(θ)) = {x} if x ∈ E(P(θ)); otherwise
Ex(PE(θ)) = {y ∈ A : there exist S ∈ W (C), y mS x and there does not exist z ∈ A, zPy}, or
Ex(PE(θ)) = {z ∈ A : there exist S ∈ W (C) and y ∈ A, y mS x and zPy}.
SRx(PEs(θ)) is defined similarly as Ex(PE(θ)) by replacing E(PE(θ)) by SR(PEs(θ))) and ymSx
by y msdS x in the definition of Ex(PE(θ)).
From Definition 3, each equilibrium policy is its own prediction, but there might exist predicted
policies that are not equilibria. The analysis indicates that the predicted reciprocity set (resp.
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predicted sophisticated reciprocity set) from any given status quo policy is non-empty because the
voting procedure involves a finite number of sequential actions. In other words, in a political economy
PE(θ) = 〈N,A, V rm, C, R(θ)〉 (resp. PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉), a reciprocity equilibrium
(resp. sophisticated reciprocity equilibrium) is a fixed point of the correspondence Ex(PE(θ)) (resp.
SRx(PEs(θ)).
3.4 Applications of The Reciprocity Set to Effectivity Functions and
Strategic Form Games
In Section 3.4, we apply the reciprocity set to effectivity functions and strategic form games.18
To perform these applications, we need additional notations. We use the concept of “effectivity
functions” in place of a constitution to distribute power or abilities among coalitions over the policy
space.19 We represent a political economy as an array PE(θ) = 〈N,A, V rm, {→S}S∈F∈N , R(θ)〉,
where N is a finite set of agents, A is the policy space, V rm is the voting procedure with reciprocity
clauses, F is a collection of admissible coalitions, {→S}S∈F∈N is an “effectivity function” (Chwe,
1994) describing the distribution of abilities among the admissible coalitions in F—where for each
S ∈ F , →S is a binary relation defined over A—, and R(θ) is a preference profile defined over A.
For each element S ∈ F , the effectivity function →S determines the set of actions that S can take
in the decision-making process. For instance, for x, y ∈ A, the notation x→S y indicates that S has
the ability (or power) to replace x by y if given the opportunity to do so. Additionally, the effectivity
function →S is monotonic: for x, y ∈ A and S, T ∈ N such that S ⊂ T , x→S y implies x→T y.
Monotonicity means that if a coalition S has the power to replace x by y, then a coalition that is
larger than S (in the sense of set inclusion) has that power too. This is a plausible assumption in
voting games.
We extend the reciprocity set to this larger setting. In fact, given a status quo x ∈ A, a
pair (y, S) ∈ A × N is a plausible objection against x if x →S y and yPS(θ)x. A pair (z, T ) ∈
A×N is a plausible counter-objection against a plausible objection (y, S) if y →T z, zPT (θ)y and
not(yRT (θ)x). The reciprocity set consists of justified plausible objections. Consider a strategic
form game Λ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉, where N is a non-empty set of agents, each agent i ∈ N
has a finite, non-empty, strategy set Xi and a utility or payoff function ui : X × Θ → R, where
X = ×i∈NXi is the set of strategy profiles. Given S ∈ N , let XS = ×i∈SXi, and given x ∈ X, let
xS = (xi)i∈S. The reciprocity set naturally extends to strategic form games because, as shown in
Chwe (1994), they are a subclass of effectivity function games.20 Indeed, in what follows, we can
write a strategic form game using effectivity functions.
18For expositional purposes, we will only be working with the reciprocity set. However, all the properties of the
reciprocity set that we uncover are also valid for the sophisticated reciprocity set.
19See, for example, Chwe (1994) and Fotso et al. (2017), for a brief survey of games that are defined with effectivity
functions.
20The class of effectivity function games includes other prominent subclasses including transferable-utility games,
non-transferable-utility games, and network games. It follows that the domain of the reciprocity set is large.
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Our application of the reciprocity set to strategic form games follows Chwe (1994, pp. 313–318)
who conducts a similar analysis using the largest consistent set. However, as we explain in Section 7
and in the Supplement Materials, our solution concepts differ significantly in terms of their properties.
For example, the largest consistent set may select a non-Pareto-efficient alternative, whereas the
reciprocity (sophisticated reciprocity) set may not.
We apply the reciprocity set to make predictions in each of the following situations involving a
strategic form game Λ. I. Agents play a simultaneous-move game (Chwe, 1994, p. 313); II. Agents
announce “individual contingent treats” (Greenberg, 1990, p. 98), or coalitions of agents announce
“coalitional contingent threats”(Greenberg, 1990, p. 102); and III. Coalitional deviations satisfy the
“self-enforceability”criterion (see, for example, Bernheim et al. (1987)). We present our applications
to the first two situations. One can easily derive the last situation from the analysis below and the
contributions of Chwe (1994, pp. 313–318).
I. First, the reciprocity set can predict which of several pure strategy Nash equilibria will emerge
as the result of a finite-horizon bargaining procedure with perfect information. Let A = NE(Λ)
represent the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of a strategic form game Λ. For x, y ∈ A, let
yRi(θ)x if ui(y, θ) ≥ ui(x, θ), and let x →S y if xN−S = yN−S. For example, consider the two-
agent game described in Table 1. Agent i’s strategy set is Xi = {ia, ib, ic}, for i = 1, 2, and
u(x, θ) ≡ u(x) = (u1(x), u2(x)) for any x ∈ X. There are three pure strategy Nash equilibria:
NE(Λ) = {(1a, 2a), (1b, 2b), (3a, 3b)}. If we consider A = NE(Λ), then the reciprocity set is
E(PE(θ)) = {(1a, 2a)}. The latter consists of the only Pareto-efficient alternative in NE(Λ). Given
that each option in A is a result of the situation in which agents play a simultaneous-move game,
the reciprocity set makes a prediction about which alternative is likely to result from the bargaining




1a (3, 3) (0, 3) (0, 0)
1b (3, 0) (2, 2) (0, 2)
1c (0, 0) (2, 0) (1, 1)
Table 1: Of the three Nash equilibria, the reciprocity set selects only one
II. Second, we can apply the reciprocity set to“individual contingent threats situations”or“coali-
tional contingent threats situations”, a setting in which agents in the strategic form game do not play
a simultaneous-move game. Instead, each coalition S facing a strategy profile x ∈ X can announce:
“If all you other agents stick to playing xN−S, we will play yS ∈ XS instead of xS.”21 Agents can
announce and update such threats in the decision-making process when they have the opportunity
to do so, without any commitment. Let A = X. For x, y ∈ A, let yRi(θ)x if ui(y, θ) ≥ ui(x, θ),
and let x →S y if xN−S = yN−S. The reciprocity set in the contingent threats situation contains
21The quote is adapted from Greenberg (1990, p. 102) and Chwe (1994, p. 315).
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the strong Nash equilibria. A strategy profile x ∈ X is a strong Nash equilibrium if for all S ∈ N ,
and for all yS ∈ XS − {xS}, there exists j ∈ S such that uj(x, θ) ≥ uj((yS, xN−S), θ). Let SN(Λ)
be the set of strong (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of the game Λ. A strategy profile x ∈ SN(Λ)
implies that no coalition (including the grand coalition, i.e., all agents collectively) can profitably
deviate from x. It follows that any x ∈ SN(Λ) is both Pareto-efficient and a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Let Λ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 be a strategic form game in which N is finite and
non-empty and the strategic sets Xi are finite and non-empty. Consider PE(θ) = 〈N,A, V rm, {→S
}S∈F∈N , R(θ)〉 be a political economy corresponding to the contingent threats situation, where
A = ×i∈NXi, yRi(θ)x if ui(y, θ) > ui(x, θ), and x →S y if xN−S = yN−S. If x ∈ SN(Λ), then
x ∈ E(PE(θ)).
Proof of Proposition 2. Say x ∈ SN(Λ) and x /∈ E(PE(θ)). Then, there exists (y, S) ∈ A × N
such that x →S y and yPS(θ)x. By definition of PE(θ), xN−S = yN−S. Thus, yPS(θ)x implies
that ui((yS, xN−S), θ) > ui(x, θ), for each i ∈ S. The latter contradicts the fact that x is a strong
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, x ∈ SN(Λ) implies x ∈ E(PE(θ)).
In the game displayed in Table 1, the profile (1a, 2a) is the only strong Nash equilibrium and
the reciprocity set is {(1a, 2a)}. However, the reciprocity set and the strong Nash equilibrium may
differ. For example, consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: each of the N agents chooses either to
cooperate (C) or to defect (D), and D is the best action when the other player plays C. However, if
all the players choose D, then the outcome of the game is worse to all of them than the outcome
that arises if all choose C. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game doesn’t admit a strong Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies (and the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (D,D)), while the profile in which
each agent plays C is the unique element in the reciprocity set. Also, in the game described in Table
2 where N = {1, 2, 3}, and agent i’s strategy set is Xi = {ia, ib}, for i ∈ N . The game admits no
strong Nash equilibrium, while the reciprocity set is {(1a, 2a, 3a), (1a, 2b, 3b), (1b, 2b, 3a)}.
Agent 1
Agent 2
2a 2b 2a 2b
1a 1, 2, 3 0, 0, 0 1a 4, 0, 4 3, 1, 2
1b 0, 4, 4 2, 3, 1 1b 0, 0, 0 4, 4, 0
3a 3a 3b 3b
Agent 3
Table 2: No strong Nash equilibria exist
These examples highlight some nice properties of the reciprocity set as a solution concept. Indeed,
we will show that, unlike the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria, the reciprocity set is never empty
(that is, a reciprocity equilibrium always exists), and all reciprocity equilibria are Pareto-efficient.
The next section provides some examples to illustrate the reciprocity mechanism.
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3.5 Examples
In the following example, we illustrate the reciprocity set and its non-cooperative implementation to
a game consisting of selecting a beverage for a party.
Example 2. (Juice, wine, or beer?) Suppose that five friends, Anneli, Barbara, Connie, Diane,
and Lucy are selecting a party beverage. For reasons of saving some money from economy of
buying in bulk, they decide to choose a common beverage. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} be the set of
friends and B = {b1, b2, b3} be the set of beverages, where b1 is juice, b2 is wine, and b3 is beer.
The preference profile R(θ) over beverages is the following: Anneli (friend 1) : b3P1(θ)b2P1(θ)b1;
Barbara (friend 2) : b3P2(θ)b2P2(θ)b1; Connie (friend 3) : b2P3(θ)b1P3(θ)b3; Diane (friend 4) :
b1P4(θ)b3P4(θ)b2; and Lucy (friend 5) : b1P5(θ)b2P5(θ)b3. We suppose that the constitution C is
defined as: S ∈ W (C) if either (|S| = 3 and 5 /∈ S) or (|S| ≥ 4). Figure 5 shows the popularity
relationship among the various beverages (for example, beer (b3) is more popular than wine (b2) as
the former is preferred by three out of the four friends not including friend 5). One can check that
b1 b2 b3
{1,2,3} {1,2,4}
Figure 5: Popularity relationship among the beverages
the reciprocity set is E(PE(θ)) = {b1, b3}. To understand why, assume that b1 is the status quo.
Despite the fact that each player in the winning coalition {1, 2, 3} prefers b2 to b1, this coalition will
not form to move to b2 because player 3 will not join it; in fact, if this coalition forms and moves
to b2 and Nature does not end the game, player 4 will oppose this move in Stage 2 of the game
and coalition {1, 2, 3} will withdraw b2 in the Stage 3 because if it does not, players in the winning
coalition {1, 2, 4} will move to b3 in Stage 4, which is the worst option for player 3. If b2 is the
status quo, it is clear that {1, 2, 4} will move to b3, which is why b3 is not a reciprocity equilibrium.
If b3 is the status quo, no winning coalition will form to move to another alternative. It follows that
E(PE(θ)) = {b1, b3}.
Now, let us model this game as an extensive form game and show that the only alternatives
that are the outcomes of (subgame perfect) maxmin equilibria if these alternatives are proposed as
status quo are b1 and b3. Assume the order of moves in the discussion between the friends is given
by the protocol φ = (12354), i.e., Anneli is first, Barbara is second, Connie is third, Lucy is fourth,
and Diane is fifth.
1. If b1 is the status quo, then Anneli has the choice of proposing b2. If she does that, then each
friend in the group S = {1, 2, 3} will vote for b2, and Lucy and Diane will vote for b1, yielding b2 the
motion on the floor because S ∈ W (C). Note that Anneli and the other friends make self-interested
decisions here (you propose or vote for b2 against b1 because you prefer the former to the latter)
since there is a possibility that friends might run out of time (Nature), and decide to end the process
at b2. Otherwise, the game continues and Lucy can oppose b2. Then, each friend in S votes on
whether or not to maintain her support for b2. If the withdrawal fails, Lucy is the first opponent
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of b2 to make a proposal against b2. According to Lucy’s preferences, she will propose b1, and the
vote between b2 and b1 will yield b2 as the winner. Then, Diane, the second opponent against b2
will propose b3 against b2, and b3 will win because it is more popular than b2. But b3 is the worst
alternative for Connie (friend 3). It follows from backward induction that Connie will vote for the
withdrawal in Step 4 resulting in the remaining coalition of supporters S − {3} = {1, 2} /∈ W (C)
becoming a losing coalition, and the status quo b1 will be the final adopted decision. This conclusion
remains if we choose any other order of moves. It follows that all the (subgame perfect) maxmin
equilibria lead to the outcome b1: SPE(G
Na) = {b1} for every G ∈ FNa(b1, θ).
2. If b2 is the status quo, following the protocol φ = (12354), Anneli proposes b3 against b2,
and the friends vote between b3 and b2. Each person in S
′ = {1, 2, 4} votes for b3, and Connie and
Lucy vote for b2. Given that S
′ ∈ W (C), the alternative b3 defeats b2. If Nature does not end the
discussion, then either Connie or Lucy can oppose b3 in Step 3, and each friend in S
′ decides to
maintain or withdraw her initial support to b3. Given their preferences, there is no alternative that
will defeat b3, and each person in S
′ maintains the initial decision in Step 2, and the withdrawal fails.
According to the protocol φ, Lucy is recognized to make a proposal against b3, and she can propose
either b1 or b2. If Lucy proposes b1, each friend in {3, 4, 5} votes for b1, while Anneli and Barbara
vote for b3. Given that {3, 4, 5} /∈ W (C), the proposal b3 remains on the floor. If Lucy proposes b2,
then b3 will defeat b2. Given that Connie also proposes either b2 or b1 against b3, it follows that no
alternative defeats the latter in Step 6, and from backward induction SPE(GNa) = {b3} for every
GNa ∈ FNa(b2, θ).
3. If b3 is the status quo, each friend has no incentive to make a different proposal against b3,
given its popularity. Any other unilateral deviation from that strategy profile is deterred. In fact,
according to the protocol φ = (12354), the first friend who can propose a different choice against
b3 is Connie (friend 3), and she will propose either b2 or b1. After Connie’s moves, the process that
follows is similar to the game described in 2. We have similar situations when either Diane or Lucy
moves. Therefore, if b3 is the status quo, the game ends in Step 1, and b3 is the final choice. Hence,
SPE(GNa) = {b3} for every GNa ∈ FNa(b3, θ). Thus, E(PE(θ)) = {b1, b3}, and the friends can buy
either juice or beer for the party.
The second example set out below elucidates the difference between the reciprocity set and the
predicted reciprocity set.
Example 3. (Predicted versus Equilibrium Policies) Consider a political economy PE(θ), where
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, A = {a, b, c, d}, C is the majority rule, and the preference profile R(θ) over
the set A is given as follows: bP1(θ)dP1(θ)cP1(θ)a; dP2(θ)bP2(θ)cP2(θ)a; cP3(θ)bP3(θ)dP3(θ)a;
cP4(θ)bP4(θ)aP4(θ)d; aP5(θ)dP5(θ)cP5(θ)b; and aP6(θ)dP6(θ)cP6(θ)b. Let S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, T =
{3, 4, 5, 6}, and U = {1, 2, 5, 6}. The domination or popularity graph among policies based on
preferences is provided in Figure 6. The reciprocity set is E(PE(θ)) = {b, d}, and the predicted
reciprocity sets are: Ea(PE(θ)) = {c}, Eb(PE(θ)) = {b}, Ec(PE(θ)) = {d}, and Ed(PE(θ)) =
{d}. If the policy a is the status quo, then the policy c will be elected, since (c, S) is a justified
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objection against a. However, c is not a reciprocity equilibrium because if c itself is the status quo,
then the winning coalition U will object against c by proposing d. Since there is no other possibility









Figure 6: Predicted versus Equilibrium Policies (the arrows indicate the direction of the popularity
relationship; for instance b is a more popular policy than a because b is preferred over a by the
majority coalition S)
The next example is a modification of the traditional ultimatum game. In this modified version,
objections can only be made by winning coalitions with respect to a specific constitution. In the
Supplement Materials, we provide more details on how to derive the reciprocity set and the predicted
reciprocity set for this example.
Example 4. (Ultimatum game with counter-offer) A population of n agents must share an
amount of 100 dollars, with each agent receiving a non-negative portion. The set of feasible alloca-
tions is the simplex:




Assume that the constitution C is majority rule, and for the state θ ∈ Θ, the preference profile
R(θ) = (Ri(θ))i∈N is defined as follows: for x, y ∈ A, and i ∈ N , yRi(θ)x if ui(y) ≥ ui(x), where
ui : A −→ R is agent i’s payoff function. The decision-making process follows the voting procedure
V rm. An arbitrator proposes a status quo allocation x0 = (0, 0, ..., 0). The traditional ultimatum
game is played between two agents (a proposer and a responder) and, unlike the procedure V rm,
it does not allow for further negotiation after the first move. An interesting question is whether a
reciprocity equilibrium exists. Assume that each agent i’s utility function is strictly increasing in his
or her payoff xi, which is a natural assumption. Then, in this framework, a reciprocity equilibrium
always exists, though it might not be unique. Furthermore, if agents have other-regarding preferences
(with each agent i’s utility depending on both his or her payoff xi and other agents’ payoffs x−i) and
if utilities are continuous (but not necessarily differentiable), we show that a reciprocity equilibrium
always exists, and that all equilibria are Pareto-efficient. To illustrate, suppose that there are three




u2(x1, x2, x3) = x2 − 13(x1 − x2)−
1
3




Interpreting these utility functions, agents have fairness considerations or other-regarding preferences
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in that fixing the payoff of an agent i and increasing the payoff of another agent has the effect of
decreasing i’s utility. The analysis proves that (see more details in the Supplement Materials) the
set of predicted allocations from the status quo x0 is:
Ex0(PE(θ)) =
{
(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 100 and xi ≥
100
6
; i = 1, 2, 3
}
,
and the reciprocity set is (observe that Ex0(P(θ)) ⊂ E(P(θ)):
E(PE(θ)) =
(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 100, and there do not exist two agentsi, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (i 6= j) such that xi = xj = 0; i, j = 1, 2, 3
 .
The determination of all of the equilibria under the reciprocity mechanism is possible in certain
contexts (for instance, Examples 2, 3, and 4). However, in certain other political economies, the
process can be tedious. The question then arises as to whether it is feasible to prove the existence
and analyze the properties of equilibrium policies under very general conditions. The next section
establishes more general results on the existence of reciprocity equilibria in our framework.
4 Existence of Reciprocity Equilibria
The results in Section 4 reveal that a reciprocity equilibrium always exists under very natural assump-
tions on agents’ preferences. Interestingly, when preferences have particular known structures, there
might exist only one or two equilibria. However, uniqueness is not to be expected in general, which
might explain why structurally identical societies can have very different policies. Each subsection
that follows makes a different assumption about the structure of preferences and of the policy space,
and analyzes the existence of reciprocity equilibria under this assumption. Generally, the identity of
an equilibrium policy depends on three structural factors: (1) the structure of preferences; (2) the
nature of the political space; and (3) the size of the voting population.
4.1 Discrete Policy Space
Section 4.1 deals with the existence of equilibria when agents have linear or strict preferences over
a finite set of policies. Preference linearity simply means that agents have a strict ordering of all of
the available policies. We have the following result.
Theorem 4. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 be a political economy. Assume that A is finite
(|A| <∞) and Ri(θ) is a linear ordering for all i ∈ N . Then, a reciprocity equilibrium exists (that
is, the reciprocity set is not empty).
Proof of Theorem 4. Let x, y ∈ A be two policies, and S ∈ W (C) be a winning coalition. Note
that (y, S) is justified plausible objection against x or y mS x if and only if a) yPS(θ)x; and, b)
[∀(z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C), S 6= T, zPT (θ)y and not(yRT (θ)x)] implies [zRS(θ)x]. Define the real-
valued function f : A −→ R as follows: for all x ∈ A, define f(x) = | {y ∈ A; yP (θ)x} | (where
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|X| denotes the cardinality of the set X) and let x0 ∈ A such that f(x0) = min
x∈A
{f(x)}. We show
that x0 ∈ E(PE(θ)). If this assertion is not true, then there exists y ∈ A and S ∈ W (C), such that
y mS x0. It follows that:{
(α) yPS(θ)x, S ∈ W (C)
(β) ∀(z, T ) : T 6= S, zPT (θ)y, T ∈ W (C) and not(yRT (θ)x)⇒ zRSx
(1)
By definition of x0 and given the fact that the binary relation P (θ) is asymmetric, there exists
c ∈ A such that cP (θ)y and not(cP (θ)x0). Thus, there exists a coalition T , with T ∈ W (C) such
that cPT (θ)y. If yPT (θ)x0, then we have cPT (θ)y and yPT (θ)x0, so that cPT (θ)x0 by transitivity,
which contradicts not(cP (θ)x0). Suppose that not(yPT (θ)x0). Then according to the assertion
(β) in equation (1), we have cPS(θ)x0, which contradicts not(cP (θ)x0). We conclude that x0 ∈
E(PE(θ)).
Theorem 4 is illustrated in Examples 2 and 3. These examples also reveal that a multiplicity of
reciprocity equilibria can emerge in our framework. The empirical implications of this finding are
that different policies might prevail in structurally identical economies.
4.2 Continuous Policy Space
We assume that the policy space A is a compact and convex subset of the multidimensional vector
space. Without loss of generality, we assume that A = [0, 1]k where k is a natural number. We
also denote by LM the Lebesgue measure on the affine manifold spanned by A. Given the nature
of the policy space, we analyze the existence of an equilibrium policy when agents display linear and
continuous preferences over A.
Theorem 5. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 be a political economy, and assume that agent
preferences are continuous, linear, and endowed with the topology of closed convergence. Then, a
reciprocity equilibrium exists.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let g : A −→ R be the real-valued function defined over the policy A by
g(x) = LM({y ∈ A : yP (θ)x}). Given the fact that preferences are continuous, and A is compact
and convex, there exists x1 ∈ A such that g(x1) = min
x∈A
{g(x)}. Following the same reasoning as in
the proof of Theorem 4, we show that x1 ∈ E(PE(θ)).
In Section 4.2.1, we present an application to a classical and widely studied framework.
4.2.1 Left-Right Political Spectrum: Median Voter Theorem
We examine the predictions of the reciprocity mechanism when the policy space can be represented
by a left-right political spectrum (see, for example, Castles and Mair (1984), Giddens (1994), Bobbio
(1996), and Evans et al. (1996)), agent preferences are single-peaked, and the constitution is majority
rule. Real-life political situations that can be modeled by this framework are numerous, which is
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perhaps the reason why it has been widely studied in the literature (see, for example, Black (1948),
Inada (1964), Grandmont (1978), Moulin (1980), Sprumont (1991), Thomson (1997), Austen-Smith
and Banks (1999), Ehlers et al. (2002), Austen-Smith and Banks (2005), Barberà et al. (2017)). A
preference relation over a policy space is said to be single-peaked if the policies can be ordered as
points on a line; and if the preference relation has a maximum point; and if points farther away from
this maximum point are less preferred. To make this definition precise, let us assume that all the
policies are ordered by a binary relation denoted , and that all agents perceive these policies as
being arranged in this order. An agent i has a single-peaked preference Ri(θ) if there exists a policy
or peak p∗i such that: (1) for any other policy p 6= p∗i , p∗iPi(θ)p ; and (2) for any policy p, q ∈ A, if
[p  q  p∗i or p∗i  q  p], then qRi(θ)p. We will assume that the set of policies is the set of
the ideal points of agents.
Our main result is that there exists at least one and at most two reciprocity equilibria when
agents having single-peaked preferences. In addition, when the number of agents is odd, there is
only one equilibrium policy, and the latter coincides with the ideal policy of the median voter.
Proposition 3. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 be a political economy. Assume that preferences
are single-peaked over A, and C is majority rule. Then, there exists at least one and at most two
reciprocity equilibria. In addition, if n is odd, there exists only one reciprocity equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. Given that the dimension of A is 1, we can assume that the relation  is
the natural ordering ≥ (and > the strict part of ≥). Let p ∈ A be a policy and define S(p) as the
number of agents for whom p is the peak. Consider the real-valued functions f and g defined on A










. Let Af = {p ∈ A : p is
a peak and f(p) ≥ 0} and Ag = {p ∈ A : p is a peak and g(p) ≥ 0}. Note that neither Af , nor
Ag is empty. Given the fact that Af is finite and the fact that f is an (strictly) increasing function,
there exists a unique peak q∗1 that minimizes f over Af . Similarly, given the fact that Ag is finite
and the fact that g is a (strictly) decreasing function, there exists a unique peak q∗2 that minimizes
g over Ag. We note the following facts:
Fact 1: For any q ∈ A, f(q) + g(q) = S(q). This is derived from the definitions of f and g.




2 > q > q
∗
1.
Fact 3: If q∗1 6= q∗2, then q∗2 > q∗1.
We prove that q∗1 and q
∗
2 are the only equilibria. We consider three cases.
Case 1: n is even and q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
∗. Then, the analysis claims that q∗ is the only equilibrium:









, which implies that q∗ is majority-preferred to q′ in a pairwise majoritarian vote.
Similarly, if q′ > q∗, we show in the same way that q∗ is majority-preferred to q′ in a pairwise
majoritarian vote. It follows that q∗ is majority-preferred to any other peak in a pairwise majoritarian
vote. Since there is no other option that is majority-preferred to q∗, then there is no justified plausible
objection against q∗. Therefore, E(PE(θ)) = {q∗}.
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Case 2: n is even and q∗1 6= q∗2. In this case, we show that, q∗1 and q∗2 are the only equilibria. First,
note that neither q∗1, nor q
∗
2 is majority-preferred to any other policy in a pairwise majoritarian vote.
Furthermore, in a pairwise majoritarian vote opposing q∗1 and q
∗











S(p) = n, each will receive exactly n
2
votes. Now, let q′ ∈ A be a peak that is
distinct from q∗1 and q
∗
2. It follows from Facts 2 and 3 that, either q
∗
1 > q




q∗1 is majority-preferred to q
′ in a pairwise majoritarian vote since the number of ballots obtained
by q∗1 against q








. Based on the fact that q∗1 is not
majority-preferred to any other policy, then q∗1 m q′. If q∗1 > q′, then q∗1 is majority-preferred to q′ in
a pairwise majoritarian vote since the number of ballots obtained by q∗1 against q







. Based on the fact that q∗1 is not majority-preferred to any other policy,
and q∗1 m q′. We conclude that E(PE(θ)) = {q∗1, q∗2}.
Case 3: n is odd. We show that q∗1 = q
∗
2. Consider the contrary, meaning that q
∗
1 6= q∗2. Fact 3
implies that q∗2 > q
∗
1. Since n is odd and there is no agent whose peak is strictly comprised within the
interval (q∗1, q
∗














































S(p), then, using the























S(p) = n. Therefore, q∗1 = q
∗
2. Referring to
Case 1, q∗ is the unique equilibrium (note that in Case 1, the proof does not necessarily use the
assumption that n is even). This concludes that E(PE(θ)) = {q∗}.
Proposition 3 is a generalization of the median voter theorem to the reciprocity mechanism.
Indeed, when the number of agents is odd, the unique equilibrium that exists is the ideal policy of
the median voter. When the number of agents is even, a median agent may not exist, and in this
case, there are two reciprocity equilibria that are very close to the center of the political spectrum.22
Example 5 set out below on the admission of refugees illustrates these two situations.
Example 5. (Admitting refugees into a peaceful country)
How many refugees should the government of a peaceful country admit? We assume that such
a decision is made by the legislators of this country. The country derives utility from the number
of refugees that it admits. The utility can be in terms of the publicity (warm glow or the internal
22Remark that this result is not a consequence of the median voter theorem for one-shot games. In fact, the
reciprocity set is in general larger than the equilibrium notion–the core–for which the original median voter theorem is
proved. However, Proposition 3 shows that the reciprocity set coincides with the core when we consider the conditions
that sustain the median voter theorem.
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feelings of warmth and satisfaction) that it receives, or in terms of the skills, knowledge, and
experience brought by the refugees. Each member of the country has a different perception of
the utility that he or she or the country receives from admitting refugees. We assume that these
considerations are reflected in the legislators’ preferences that are represented by utility functions.
The net utility received by each legislator i from p refugees being admitted is: vi(p) = ui(p)− sip,
where ui is an increasing and strictly concave function, and si is the fraction of the total cost of
refugee admission incurred by the constituency of legislator i. Assume that C is majority rule, and
the preference profile R(θ) = (Ri(θ))i∈N is defined as follows: for p and q numbers of refugees,
and i ∈ N , pRi(θ)q if vi(p) ≥ vi(q). Assume, for illustration, that there are n = 5 legislators
who have to decide on the number of refugees to be admitted, and the utility function of legislator
i is given by: vi(pi) = bi ln(pi) − 1npi, with bi = 6 − i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and the policy space
is the set of legislators’ ideal number of refugees or peaks. Under the reciprocity mechanism, the
unique reciprocity equilibrium is p∗3 = 15, the peak of the median legislator (the Condorcet winner).
However, for n = 6 and b6 = 6, there is no median legislator, and the peaks p
∗
2 = 24 and p
∗
3 = 18 are
the only reciprocity equilibria. We relegate details of the calculations to the Supplement Materials.
5 Pareto-Efficiency and the Reciprocity Set
In this section, we show that every reciprocity equilibrium is Pareto-efficiency, which is a highly
desirable property. Theorem 6 shows that the social choice correspondence E satisfies Pareto-
efficiency when the domain of preferences for each agent consists of strict or weak ordering over
discrete or continuous policy spaces.
Theorem 6. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 be a political economy. Assume A is either discrete
or continuous, and Ri(θ) is weak or strict, for all i ∈ N . Then, every x ∈ E(PE(θ)) is Pareto-
efficient.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let x ∈ A be a policy such that x ∈ E(PE(θ)). If x is not Pareto-efficient,
then there exists y ∈ A such that yPN(θ)x. It follows that for any z ∈ A such that zPT (θ)y with
T ∈ W (C), we have yPT (θ)x because T ⊂ N . Then, not(yRT (θ)x) is always false. Therefore
the implication [not(yRT (θ)x) ⇒ zRN(θ)x] is always true—that is, (y,N) is a justified plausible
objection against x, which contradicts the assumption that x ∈ E(PE(θ)). Thus, x is Pareto-
efficient.
Theorem 6 implies that the voting procedure V rm resolves the conflict between agent rationality
and optimality in public goods provision. As we prove in Section 3.1.1, by inducing selfish agents
to adopt reciprocal and pro-social behavior, the procedure prevents free-riding, which is one reason
why the reciprocity set cannot select a non-Pareto-efficient policy. This property also distinguishes
the reciprocity set from several prominent solution concepts as we show in Section 7 and in the
Supplement Materials (Section 3).
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6 Inclusiveness: Strategic Minority Protection, Rawlsian Jus-
tice, and Fairness Under the Reciprocity Mechanism
In this section, we uncover other desirable properties of the reciprocity mechanism and the reciprocity
set. We study inclusiveness under this mechanism. We do it in two different ways. The first
approach consists of studying the “decisive minority” phenomenon—where an option preferred by
a minority group can win a democratic election. We observe that policies that are preferred by
minority groups (or losing coalitions) under a given constitution can emerge as reciprocity equilibria.
In the political economy literature, two main reasons have been provided to explain the “decisive
minority” phenomenon, namely preference intensity and free-riding. Campbell (1999) provides a
detailed description of these arguments. In Section 6.1, we provide an additional argument to the
decisive minority phenomenon, which is voters’ farsighted (or strategic) behavior.
The second approach to studying inclusiveness is to show that the reciprocity set is compatible
with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice. Indeed, in Section 6.2, following a normative
perspective, we show that the reciprocity set of a distributive economy always contains outcomes of
two prominent concepts of distributive justice—the Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953)—that are well-known in economic theory to have other desirable properties
towards “minorities” or the worse-off.23 More precisely, the nucleolus maximizes the welfare of the
worse-off and is therefore considered as a formalization of Rawlsian justice (see, for example, Serrano
(2020), and the references therein), and the Shapley value is a well-known notion of fairness (Aguiar
et al. (2020), Aguiar et al. (2018)).
6.1 Decisive Minority Under the Reciprocity Mechanism
In our treatment of minority interests, a minority group is simply a set of agents who, in a particular
context, favor a policy alternative that a majority of agents dislike. Minority groups can also include
a group of agents with a “fixed” identity, such as an ethnic or a religious group (see Example 6
below). In our framework, protecting minority interests means allowing policies that may only be
preferred by minority groups in the society to be part of the set of reciprocity equilibria. It is worth
pointing out that our goal is not to propose specific policies that might protect minority interests.
We are interested in uncovering whether a minority option can be an equilibrium under the reciprocity
mechanism. In what follows, we formally define the notions of minority and majority options. We
also define the concept of “strategic” minority protection, which we distinguish from the notion of
“mechanical”minority protection. In Definitions 4 and 5, we assume that a political economy PE(θ)
is any array PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V, R(θ)〉, where V is a voting procedure which consists of finite or
infinite stages.
Definition 4. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V, R(θ)〉 be a political economy, and x ∈ A be an alternative.
23We thank the Editor Tilman Börger for encouraging us to examine the relationship between fairness and the
reciprocity set.
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1. x is said to be a minority option if there exists an alternative y ∈ A that is preferred to x
by a winning coalition S ∈ W (C): yPS(θ)x. If a policy is not a minority option, we say that it is a
majority option.
2. A minority option x is said to be non-strategic if there exist a majority option y ∈ A and a
winning coalition S ∈ W (C) such that yPS(θ)x.
Definition 5. Let E be a solution concept.24
1. E is said to mechanically protect minority interests if there exist PE(θ) ∈ P, and a minority
option x ∈ A, such that x ∈ E(PE(θ)).
2. E is said to strategically protect minority interests if E mechanically protects minority interests,
and for any PE(θ) ∈ P, the set E(PE(θ)) never contains a non-strategic minority option.
Intuitively, the definition of the strategic protection of minority interests takes into account the
fact that decision-makers are farsighted. We have the following result.
Proposition 4. The reciprocity set strategically protects minority interests.25
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a political economy PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉, where N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, A = {x, y, z}, C is the majority rule, and preference profile R(θ) is defined as follows:
zP1(θ)yP1(θ)x; zP2(θ)yP2(θ)x; yP3(θ)xP3(θ)z; and xP4(θ)zP4(θ)y. The policy y is majority-
preferred to x. Then x is a minority option. Since x ∈ E(PE(θ)), it follows that the reciprocity set
mechanically protects minority interests. Now, fix PE(θ) = 〈N,A, V, C, R(θ)〉 and x a non-strategic
minority option. Then, there exist a majority option y ∈ A and a winning coalition S ∈ W (C) such
that yPS(θ)x. It follows that (y, S) is a justified plausible objection against x and x /∈ E(PE(θ)).
Proposition 4 shows that a minority option can be preserved because of voters’ farsighted be-
havior. Farsightedness is indeed one of the key features of rational behavior under the reciprocity
mechanism. We however show that, under this behavior, not all minority options can be protected; in
particular, minority options that are non-strategic (that is, minority options that are dominated by a
majority option) cannot be selected by the reciprocity set. Remark also that the strategic protection
of minority interests under the reciprocity mechanism can be achieved under majority rule. Our anal-
ysis therefore provides an additional explanation of the “decisive minority” phenomenon (Campbell,
1999), especially in a context where a minority group does not necessarily have a “fixed” identity.
Campbell (1999) considers a costly majority rule voting environment with private information. A
random set of voters decide on two alternatives, with the possibility of abstention. A“zealous voter”
24A solution concept E is a social choice correspondence which maps any political economy PE(θ) into a subset
E(PE(θ)) ⊆ A; E(PE(θ)) is interpreted as the set of equilibrium outcomes of PE(θ) when agents adopt the rational
behavior that defines E.
25Interestingly, it directly follows from this result that if there exists a Condorcet policy, it will be the only option
of the reciprocity set. This derives from the fact that a Condorcet policy is majority-preferred to any other policy,
implying that any policy that is different from the Condorcet policy is a non-strategic minority option and therefore
cannot belong to the reciprocity set according to Proposition 4.
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is an agent who has either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating
in the election. Campbell shows that a minority group of zealous voters secures their preferred
policy with high probability in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium if the expected population is large.
Free-riding and preference intensity sustain the predictions of minority options as equilibrium policies
under Campbell’s framework. In addition to the fact that our model differs from Campbell (1999),
we propose farsighted behaviors as another argument for the “decisive minority” phenomenon.
In what follows, we illustrate the result of Proposition 4 in a multi-ethnic society faced with
the task of choosing a language other than the national language(s) to be taught in schools and
to be used in official communication. The main purpose of the government is to protect linguistic
diversity.
Example 6. Assume that a country that consists of four ethnic groups has to choose from a set
of three languages, the ones to be used both in school and in official communication. Let N =
{1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of ethnic groups and L = {l1, l2, l3} be the set of languages. Each ethnic group
has one representative. Language l3 is the most commonly spoken language in ethnic groups 1 and
2; l2 is the native language of ethnic group 3; and l1 is a minority language that is mostly spoken in
ethnic group 4. We define the preference profile R(θ) = (R1(θ), R2(θ), R3(θ), R4(θ)) over languages
as follows. Ethnic group 1 : l3P1(θ)l2P1(θ)l1; Ethnic group 2 : l3P2(θ)l2P2(θ)l1; Ethnic group 3 :
l2P3(θ)l1P3(θ)l3; and Ethnic group 4 : l1P4(θ)l3P4(θ)l2. We suppose that the constitution C is
majority rule. Figure 7 shows the popularity relationship among the various languages (for example,
l3 is more popular than l2 as the former is preferred by three out of the four ethnic groups). The
l1 l2 l3
{1,2,3} {1,2,4}
Figure 7: Popularity relationship among the languages
analysis demonstrates that there are two reciprocity equilibrium languages. These languages are l1
and l3. In fact, if l3 is the status quo, it will persist indefinitely, since it is not majority-preferred by
any other language. If l2 is the status quo, the majority coalition {1, 2, 4} will object and propose
l3, given the fact that each of its members strictly prefers l3 over l2. Despite the fact that ethnic
group 3 is opposed to that plausible objection, it cannot succeed at forming a majority coalition
that will formulate a plausible counter-objection that will lead to the replacement of l3. It follows
that l2 /∈ E(PE(θ)). If the status quo is l1, no majority coalition will formulate a plausible objection
against it. In fact, although the members of {1, 2, 3} strictly prefer l2 over l1, they know that if
they formulate a plausible objection (l2, {1, 2, 3}) against l1, {1, 2, 4} will formulate an unfriendly
plausible counter-objection (l3, {1, 2, 4}) against (l2, {1, 2, 3}). Indeed, the move from l1 to l2 will
harm the interests of ethnic group 4, which is the reason for the plausible counter-objection. The
latter is unfriendly because not all members of {1, 2, 3} prefer l3 over the status quo l1. Therefore
l1 ∈ E(PE(θ)). It follows that E(PE(θ)) = {l1, l3}.
Interestingly, remark that l1 is a minority language because, unlike l3, it is spoken by only one
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ethnic group, and l2 is majority-preferred over l1. Also, l1 is a “strategic” minority option, whereas
l2 is a “non-strategic” minority option although it is majority-preferred over l1. This illustrates an
instance in which minority interests are strategically protected under the reciprocity mechanism.
This example also shows that the reciprocity mechanism encourages diversity. Indeed, the political
authority could decide that only equilibrium languages will be used for public communication. In
that case, languages l1 and l3 will be used, leading to an officially bilingual country.
6.2 Rawlsian Justice and Fairness Considerations: The Nucleolus and
The Shapley value
The Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) are known in economic
theory to have desirable properties towards “minorities” and the worse-off. These properties include
normative principles such as welfare-maximization (the Nucleolus), and fairness (the Shapley value).
Consider a political economy PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉, where A, the set of feasible allocations,
is the simplex: A = {x ∈ [0, 1]n :
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1}, and the preference profile R(θ) is defined as follows:
for x, y ∈ A, yRi(θ)x if yi ≥ xi. We need additional definitions and notations before introducing
the result of Section 6.2.
Given a political economy PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 ∈ P, the pair GCθ = (N, C) defines a
simple game, where the function C maps each subset S ∈ N = N ∪ {∅} to either 0 or 1, with





e(S, x) = x(S)− C(S) =
x(S)− 1 ≤ 0 if S ∈ W (C)x(S) ≥ 0 if S /∈ W (C) .
e(S, x) is the welfare (or satisfaction) of subset S at x. For x ∈ A, we denote e(x) = (e(S, x))S∈N
and e∗(x) the permutation of entries of e(x) arranged in increasing order.
We say that e(x) is leximin superior to e(y)—denoted by e(x)Plxme(y)—, for y ∈ A, if e∗(x) is
lexicographically superior to e∗(y), i.e., there exists k + 1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2n} such that e∗t (x) = e∗t (y)
for t = 1, 2, ..., k and e∗k+1(x) > e
∗
k+1(y).
In the political economy PE(θ), we examine the relationship between the reciprocity set on the
one hand and the Nucleolus and the Shapley value of the simple game GCθ = (N, C) on the other
hand. We recall the definitions of these concepts below.
Definition 6. The Nucleolus of the game GCθ = (N, C) is:
nc(GCθ ) =: {x ∈ A : x(N) = 1 and @y ∈ A, e(y)Plxme(x)}.
It has been shown that the Nucleolus always exists and it is a single-valued allocation rule
(Schmeidler, 1969). The Nucleolus lexicographically maximizes the welfare e(S, x), (S, x) ∈ N ×
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A, when these numbers are ordered in an increasing magnitude. For this reason, the Nucleolus
maximizes the welfare of the worse-off and is therefore considered as a formalization of the “the
Rawlsian social welfare function to a society where each coalition’s welfare is evaluated independently”
(Iñarra et al., 2020, p.4).






|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
[C(S ∪ {i})− C(S)], for all i ∈ N.
The Shapley value is considered as a fair distribution because it is the unique allocation that
satisfies three normative principles, namely, efficiency (
∑
i∈N
Shi(N, C) = C(N) = 1), symmetry (for
all permutations π of N , Shπ(i)(N, πC) = Shi(N, C), where πC(S) = C(π(S)) for all S), and
marginality (Shi(N, C) ≥ Shi(N, C ′) as along as C(S ∪ {i})− C(S) ≥ C ′(S ∪ i)− C ′(S) for all S
and C ′ ∈ C).26 In general, the Nucleolus does not coincide with the Shapley value, see, for instance
Example 7 below. In fact, the Nucleolus satisfies efficiency and symmetry, but does not satisfy
marginality. Proposition 5 follows.
Proposition 5. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 ∈ P be a political economy. Then, nc(GCθ ) ∈
E(PE(θ)) and Sh(GCθ ) ∈ E(PE(θ)).
Proof of Proposition 5. 1. Assume that nu(GCθ ) = {x}. Suppose there exists a winning coalition T
such that xi = 0 for each i ∈ T . Then, e(T, x) = x(T )− 1 = −1, such that T is the subset with
the minimum satisfaction at x. One may assume that the vector x is such that xi = 0 if i ∈ T ,
and xi > 0 if i /∈ T . Now, consider the vector x and ε very small such that xi > 0 for each i and




xi = tε +
∑
i/∈T
xi − (n − t) tεn−t =
∑
i/∈T
xi = 1. Moreover, e(T, x) = x(T ) − 1 = tε − 1.
The parameter ε is chosen so that T still induces the minimum excess at x. Given that tε − 1 is
greater than -1, it follows that e∗(x) is lexicographically superior to e∗(x), which is a contradiction.
Hence, it is not possible to have every agent in a winning subset at x who receives a null payoff. Let
N0(x) = {i ∈ N : xi = 0}, then N0(x) /∈ W (C). If N0(x) = ∅, obviously x ∈ E(PE(θ)). Assume
that N0(x) 6= ∅. Let Lx be a subset of N −N0(x) and S = N0(x) ∪ Lx such that S ∈ W (C) with























xi = 1. Then,
y ∈ A. The pair (y, S) represents a possible plausible objection against x. Denote Sy = {i ∈ N :
yi = 0}, and consider T = Sy ∪ Ly, with Ly ⊂ N0(x), Ly ∩ Sy = ∅, and (N − N0(x)) ∩ Sy 6= ∅,




|T | if i ∈ S
y; zi = 0 if



















Then z ∈ A. Moreover, for each i ∈ T , zi > yi. This implies that zPTy. There also exists
26See, for example, Young (1985), Aguiar et al. (2018), Aguiar et al. (2020), among others.
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j ∈ (N − N0(x)) ∩ Sy such that xj > 0 and yi = 0, meaning that not(yRTx). The pair (z, T )
represents a possible plausible counter-objection against the plausible objection (y, S). Given that
there exists k ∈ S ∩ (N − N0(x)) and k /∈ T , then xk > 0 and zk = 0. This means that for any
possible plausible objection (y, S) against x, we can construct a plausible counter-objection (z, T )
so that not(zRSx). Therefore x is a reciprocity equilibrium, and nc(G
C
θ ) ∈ E(P(θ)).
2. For any GCθ = (N, C), the Shapley value assigns a non-negative value to agent i, i.e.,
Shi(G
C





θ ) = C(N) = 1. Let S ∈ N , and
i ∈ N . Agent i is decisive in S if i ∈ S, S ∈ W (C) and S − {i} /∈ W (C). In the simple game
GCθ , the Shapley value assigns 0 to agent i if and only if she is not decisive in any subset of N . Let
S = {i ∈ N : Shi(GCθ ) = 0}. Assume that S ∈ W (C). Then S 6= ∅. There exists j ∈ S and
Sj ∈ 2S ∩W (C), such that Sj − {j} /∈ W (C). This implies that j is decisive in Sj. Therefore,
Shj(G
C
θ ) > 0, a contradiction. We conclude that S /∈ W (C). Using the same reasoning in part 1,
we show that Sh(GCθ ) ∈ E(PE(θ)).
Proposition 5 implies that the reciprocity mechanism is compatible with the Rawlsian idea of
justice and fairness. Example 7 illustrates the reciprocity set, the Shapley value, and the Nucleolus
for three simple voting games.
Example 7. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 ∈ P be a political economy.
Dictator. Assume that W (C) = {S : d ∈ S}. Then, agent d is a dictator. Let xd ∈ [0, 1]n
such that: xdi = 1 if and only if i = d. Then, nc(G
C
θ ) = Sh(G
C
θ ) = x
d and E(P(θ)) = {xd}. In
this case, the reciprocity set coincides with both the Nucleolus and the Shapley value.
Compromise. Consider an environment in which N = {1, 2, 3} and C is such that W (C) =
{S : 1 ∈ S and |S| ≥ 2}. In the game, agent 1 needs either 2 or 3 to win, whereas 2 and 3 together
lose. Then, nc(GCθ ) = Sh(G
C








A Weighted majority game. Now, assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the constitution C is defined
as follows. Agents have different weights: q1 = 6, q2 = 4, q3 = 3, q4 = 2, and there is a quota
q = 8 such that S ∈ W (C) if and only if
∑
i∈S

















), and both belong to E(PE(θ)). We note here that the Nucleolus gives more
payoff to the worse-off agents than the Shapley value; the former is therefore more inclusive than
the latter.
6.3 Extension of Findings to the Sophisticated Reciprocity Set
In Section 6.3, we extend the properties of the reciprocity set to the sophisticated reciprocity set.
In particular, we focus on equilibrium existence and Pareto-efficiency. We have Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Let PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 and PEs(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V s, R(θ)〉 be two political
economies.
1. ( Equilibrium existence)
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(a) If A is discrete and finite and preferences are linear, then SR(PEs(θ)) is not empty.
(b) If A is compact and convex, and preferences are continuous, linear, and endowed with the
topology of closed convergence, then SR(PEs(θ)) is not empty.
2. ( Pareto-Efficiency) Any policy in SR(PEs(θ)) is Pareto-efficient.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let x, y ∈ A be two policies, and S ∈ W (C) be a winning coalition. We
note that y msdS x if and only if a) ∀(z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C), S 6= T , [yRT (θ)x and not(zRS(θ)x)] or
not(zRT (θ)y) implies yPS(θ)x; and, b) [∀(z, T ) ∈ A×W (C), S 6= T, zPT (θ)y and not(yRT (θ)x)]
implies [zRS(θ)x].
1. Equilibrium existence. The proof follows the demonstration of results (Theorems 4 and 5)
that ensure the existence of equilibria under the reciprocity mechanism in Section 4.
2. Pareto-efficiency. Consider x ∈ SR(PEs(θ)). Then x ∈ E(PE(θ)). Hence, x is Pareto-
efficient thanks to Theorem 6.
A few additional comments are needed. First, we note that item (2) in Theorem 7 showing that
any sophisticated reciprocity equilibrium is Pareto-efficient is a direct consequence of the fact that
any sophisticated reciprocity equilibrium is a reciprocity equilibrium, and any reciprocity equilibrium
is Pareto-efficient (Theorem 6). Second, although we do not show this formally for expositional
purposes, we remark that agents whose behavior follow the sophisticated reciprocity set behave
in a reciprocal manner, which implies that Theorem 1 generalizes to this refined solution concept.
Third, like the reciprocity set, the sophisticated reciprocity set strategically protects minorities, which
extends Proposition 4. This can be seen in Example 1, where policy y is a sophisticated reciprocity
equilibrium despite the fact that it is a minority option. We note that while y is a“strategic”minority
option, z is “non-strategic” minority option, which is why z does not belong to the sophisticated
reciprocity set. These desirable properties of the (sophisticated) reciprocity set distinguish these
solution concepts from other well-known concepts, something that we shown in Section 7.
7 Comparison with Other Voting Procedures and Solution
Concepts
We compare the reciprocity mechanism and the reciprocity set (resp. sophisticated reciprocity set)
to some classical voting procedures and their associated solution concepts following the blocking
approach when the policy space is discrete. It is important for us to strongly emphasize that the only
purpose of this comparison is to show that the reciprocity set is not a redundant solution concept.
Our goal is absolutely not to highlight the relative merits of each approach, which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Indeed, each of the solution concepts to which we compare the reciprocity set
has its own merits, and clearly captures rationality under a distinct set of structural and behavioral
assumptions. The reader will realise that our solution concept has properties that distinguish it from
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the other solution concepts, which is understandable because these other concepts do not aim to
address the same questions as the reciprocity set. The supplement Materials contain more details
on the comparative analyses. In what follows, we summarize the findings.
First, we modify the voting procedure V rm to remove the reciprocity clauses. This alternative
procedure is formalized as a two-stage process in which no policy withdrawal (or retraction) by a
sponsoring coalition is possible. We find that, under this new procedure, a non-Pareto-efficient
status quo can persist indefinitely. This result occurs because, even though some agents might be
willing to remove a non-Pareto-efficient status quo, they fear that the new policy might in turn be
replaced by another policy that is worse for them relative to the status quo. This fear prevents these
agents from removing a status quo, a situation that is avoided under the procedure V rm. Indeed,
the withdrawal clause embedded in the procedure V rm prevents free-riding and promotes pro-social
behavior, leading to only Pareto-efficient policy alternatives being selected.27
Second, we compare the reciprocity set with some solution concepts designed to capture ratio-
nality in one-shot procedures (or games). The most prominent are the von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) stable sets (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), the core (Gillies, 1959), the top cycle
set (Schwartz, 1976), and the uncovered set (Miller, 1980). All these concepts follow the blocking
approach, which makes the comparison easier. We find that, unlike the reciprocity set, one of the
latter solution concepts might select a non-Pareto-efficient policy, while others might be empty,
meaning that they might fail to yield an equilibrium policy.
Third, we extend our comparison to dynamic games, specifically farsighted coalitional games. In
such games, agents or coalitions may bargain indefinitely. The most prominent equilibrium concepts
in this class of games that follow the tradition of blocking approach are based on the notion of
indirect domination (Harsanyi, 1974; Chwe, 1994), which is a modification of direct domination,
whereby first movers anticipate future moves. Comparing the reciprocity set to these two concepts,
we find that they may lead to an inefficient policy persisting indefinitely. In a more recent study, Ray
and Vohra (2015) modify the farsighted stable sets of Harsanyi (1974) by only imposing coalitional
sovereignty (the modified solution concept uses exactly the same domination relation that defines
Harsanyi’s farsighted stable sets). Although the farsighted behavior in Ray and Vohra (2015) follows
the blocking approach, we differ in defining a “constitution or voting rule” as a tool to distribute
voting powers (or veto rights) among coalitions. For this reason, it is not intuitively reasonable to
compare the reciprocity set to the farsighted stable set à la Ray and Vohra (2015).
27One can show that the stability set, a solution concept introduced by Rubinstein (1980), is a plausible solution
concept under the modified voting procedure (without withdrawal), which explains why this solution concept generally
selects non-Pareto-efficient outcomes, as mentioned by Rubinstein (1980). Also, in results not shown here but available
upon request, we find that the reciprocity set (and hence the sophisticated reciprocity set) significantly refines the
stability set.
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Table 3: Comparison of Solution Concepts
Solution Concepts Existence and non-emptiness Efficiency SPMI
Reciprocity set Yes Yes Yes
Sophitiscated reciprocity set Yes Yes Yes
Core No Yes No
vNM stable set No Yes No
Top cycle set Yes No No
Uncovered set Yes Yes No
Harsanyi stable set No Yes Yes
Largest consistent set Yes No Yes
In Table 3, we summarize the comparisons of the aforementioned solution concepts and the
reciprocity set in terms of their properties. We also note that the sophisticated reciprocity set
satisfies similar properties as the reciprocity set, although the former is a refinement of the latter.
We say that a solution concept E satisfies the“Pareto-efficiency”property if for any political economy
PE(θ) ∈ P, the set E(PE(θ)) contains only Pareto-efficient policies. A solution concept E satisfies
the “existence and non-emptiness (or stability)” property if there does not exist a political economy
PE(θ) ∈ P such that the set E(PE(θ)) does not exist or E(PE(θ)) is empty.28 The definition
of “strategic protection of minority interests” (SPMI) is the one given in Definition 5. As shown
in Table 3, among all the solution concepts analyzed in this paper, only the reciprocity set and
the sophisticated reciprocity satisfy existence and non-emptiness, Pareto-efficiency, and SPMI. It
follows that the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set differ from all the other solution
concepts in their motivation, incentives structure, and properties. We have also shown that these
differences lead to different predictions. The reciprocity set is also compatible with classical notions
of distributive justice.29
Other approaches in modeling strategic interactions in social environments that embed voting
procedures include multilateral bargaining in legislatures. In this literature, an agenda-setting defines
a protocol that grants a veto right to agents or coalitions, and agents discount preferences with
a discount factor and they consider expected utilities when making decisions. Notable examples
include the studies pioneered by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) such as Banks and Duggan (2000), and
Diermeier et al. (2017). Our framework differs from multilateral bargaining games such as Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) and the large literature that this study has inspired for at least three reasons
that we describe below.
(i) First, the voting procedure V rm allows first movers to “retract” motions that face opposition
28As remarked by Chwe (1994), non-emptiness and existence are technically different. For instance, the core (or
the Nash equilibrium) always exists, but it might be empty; the vNM stable sets might not exist, but when they
exist, they are always non-empty. The reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set always exist and are always
non-empty.
29While it has been shown that the core always contains the Nucleolus, it may not contain the Shapley value. The
reciprocity set contains both concepts.
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and second movers to “oppose” motions they dislike and to “retaliate” in case of non-retraction by
first-movers.
(ii) Second, the models inspired by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) study a class of “distributive”
problems where agents have to split a unit of a divisible good by voting. While our framework
covers this class of problems, it addresses a larger class of problems, including problems related to
the allocation of non-divisible goods. The larger domain of the (sophisticated) reciprocity set allows
us to examine a variety of voting situations.
(iii) Third, within the class of distributive problems, our predictions sharply differ from those
of models inspired by the pioneering work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). For example, Baron
and Ferejohn show that any distribution of the good to be split can be supported as a subgame
perfect equilibrium in an infinite-session legislature with a closed rule when there is a sufficient
number of members and they are not too impatient (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, Proposition 2, p.
1189). The implication is that a non-Pareto-efficient outcome can be selected in this legislature,
whereas this cannot happen in our framework. Also, whereas a non-strategic minority option can
be selected in this legislature, this is impossible under the reciprocity mechanism. Moreover, the
proof of Proposition 5 shows that only a subset of possible allocations forms the reciprocity set.
Again, these differences in our predictions come from the fact the reciprocity voting procedure is
very different from the procedures studied in Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
8 Contributions
This study contributes to several literatures, including the literature on institutional design, the
literature on reciprocity, and the literature on equilibrium concepts that follow the blocking and
bargaining approaches in coalitional games.
We introduce the reciprocity voting procedure. Although it is new, it simply modifies well-known
procedures by introducing reciprocity clauses (such as the right to oppose, withdraw and retaliate).
In doing so, it is close enough to voting procedures employed in most legislative bodies. It provides
an incentive structure for reciprocal actions. We do not assume that agents are altruistic or have
other-regarding preferences. Although preferences may be “selfish” (meaning that agents may only
intend to care about themselves), agents find it rational to care about others and to take pro-
social and reciprocal actions. It follows that, in our setting, reciprocity is not preference-based,
it is mechanism-based. This feature distinguishes our research from the extant theoretical and
experimental literature on reciprocity which assumes that agents have other-regarding preferences
including conditional altruism (see, for example, Rabin (1993), Fehr and Gächter (1998), Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Hahn (2009)). Interestingly, in our framework, the modeler is free to
incorporate other-regarding preferences and fairness considerations (see Example 4). Another domain
that has been found to induce reciprocity and sustain cooperation under certain conditions is the
domain of infinitely repeated games (Aumann and Sorin, 1989; Bruni et al., 2008). The reciprocity
mechanism induces a finite horizon game and therefore does not require that a game be repeated
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indefinitely in order to induce reciprocity and cooperation among decision-makers.
We obtain the reciprocity set and the sophisticated reciprocity set by formalizing the rational
behavior of agents under the reciprocity voting procedure following both the blocking and the non-
cooperative approaches.30 Defining these approaches, Dutta and Vohra write:
(a) the blocking approach ... follows traditional cooperative game theory in abstracting
away from the details of the negotiation process and relying on a coalitional game to
specify what each coalition is able to accomplish on its own, and (b) the bargaining
approach ... is based on noncooperative coalition bargaining and relies on specifying
details such as a protocol that describes the order of moves. (Dutta and Vohra, 2017,
p. 1192)
To our knowledge, the reciprocity set (and the sophisticated reciprocity set) are the first solution
concepts in the tradition of the blocking approach that captures “rational reciprocal” behavior.
Additionally, we develop a non-cooperative approach to implement these solutions concepts. Other
studies have used a similar approach in farsighted coalitional games (see, for example, Herings
et al. (2004), and Granot and Hanany (2016)). Unlike Granot and Hanany (2016) who defines the
evolution of moves as an infinite extensive form game, our approach is finite. Moreover, contrary to
Herings et al. (2004), our non-cooperative framework can be viewed as an independent sequential
legislative game with no primitive connection to the reciprocity set under the blocking approach.
It follows that our mechanism embeds both elements of cooperative and non-cooperative domains
and incorporates the notion of maximality in farsighted coalition formation (Ray and Vohra, 2014;
Dutta and Vohra, 2017; Kimya, 2020). In that direction, this paper also contributes to the Nash
Program, a research agenda initiated by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the cooperative
and non-cooperative counterparts of game theory; see Serrano (2020) for a recent survey.
One feature of the one-shot mechanism in political games is its ability of ensuring that the chosen
policy is Pareto-efficient. Nevertheless, it has been criticized for its lack of political inclusiveness and
its general failure to select equilibrium policies.31 On the other hand, farsighted coalitional games
may lead to the selection and persistence of inefficient policies. The reciprocity set and and the
sophisticated reciprocity set resolve all of these pitfalls under mild conditions.
30The blocking approach goes back to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Gillies (1959) and has been
followed in a large number of studies (see, for example, Harsanyi (1974), Chwe (1994), Ray et al. (2007), Ray and
Vohra (2014), Ray and Vohra (2015), and Dutta and Vohra (2017)). Even the Nash equilibrium and hybrid solution
concepts such as pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Pongou and Serrano, 2016, 2013) can be viewed as
following the tradition of the blocking approach in the sense that these concepts abstract away from the process that
leads to a particular equilibrium, and an equilibrium is simply defined as a state that cannot be blocked by rational
agents. The non-cooperative bargaining approach can be traced back to St̊ahl (1977), Rubinstein (1982), and Baron
and Ferejohn (1989). As several scholars have argued (Roth (2020)), the two approaches are not mutually exclusive,
and can in fact be viewed as complementary (Ray and Vohra, 2014; Roth and Wilson, 2019; Kimya, 2020).
31In other words, the Nash equilibrium may not exist just as the core might be empty. See Austen-Smith and
Banks (1999, 2005) for a thorough survey and exposition of solution concepts in political games.
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The reciprocity set has a very different motivation and incentives structure than the other solution
concepts that we review in this paper. These solutions are complementary and each has its own
merits and advantages. We compare the reciprocity set to the leading solution concepts that follow
the blocking approach and find that they are very different indeed (see Section 7). For instance,
there exist political games where the prediction of the reciprocity set strictly refines some of these
concepts. In general, none of these solution concepts simultaneously guarantees policy stability
(or non-emptiness), efficiency, and the strategic protection of minority interests (see Table 3 in
Section 7) and are consistent with classical notions of distributive justice. These differences are
mainly justified by the fact that we are addressing a new question, generating new insights into the
design of mechanisms or voting procedures that foster reciprocal actions and lead to desirable social
alternatives.
9 Conclusion
This paper considers the problem faced by a political authority that has to design a legislative
mechanism that guarantees equilibrium existence, Pareto-efficiency, and inclusiveness. To address
this problem, we propose a voting procedure that embeds clauses of reciprocity. These clauses
grant voters the right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face
opposition, and punish actions that harm them. We prove this voting procedure incentivizes“selfish”
agents to display reciprocal and pro-social behaviors. We study voters’ strategic behavior under
this procedure following both the blocking approach and the non-cooperative approach. Under the
blocking approach, we introduce two new solution concepts—the reciprocity set and the sophisticated
reciprocity set—. We then show that these solution concepts satisfy non-emptiness (also known
as stability), Pareto-efficiency, and inclusiveness in the sense of strategically protecting minority
interests, and that they are compatible with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice. By
preventing political failure, these solution concepts resolve the long-established conflict between
agent rationality and Pareto-efficiency in political decisions. Following the non-cooperative approach,
we provide an implementation of each of these two solution concepts, which makes them applicable
in a wide range of legislative settings. We also extend them to effectivity functions, a large class of
games that includes the class of strategic form games. Moreover, we show that they have several
merits, especially when compared to other well-known solution concepts.
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Barberà, S., Berga, D., and Moreno, B. (2017). On the different forms of individual and group
strategic behavior, and their impact on efficiency. In Co-utility (pp. 33–48). Springer.
Baron, D. P. and Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science
Review, 83(04), 1181–1206.
Bergin, J. and Duggan, J. (1999). An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foun-
dations. Journal of Economic Theory, 86(1), 50–76.
Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., and Whinston, M. D. (1987). Coalition-proof Nash equilibria I. Concepts.
Journal of Economic Theory, 42(1), 1–12.
47
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3934127
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. The Journal of Political Economy,
(pp. 23–34).
Bobbio, N. (1996). Left and right: The significance of a political distinction. University of Chicago
Press.
Börgers, T. (2000). Is internet voting a good thing? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, (pp. 531–547).
Borgers, T. (2004). Costly voting. American Economic Review, 94(1), 57–66.
Bruni, L., Gilli, M., and Pelligra, V. (2008). Reciprocity: theory and facts. International Review of
Economics, 55(1-2), 1–11.
Campbell, C. M. (1999). Large electorates and decisive minorities. Journal of Political Economy,
107(6), 1199–1217.
Castles, F. G. and Mair, P. (1984). Left–right political scales: Some ‘expert’ judgments. European
Journal of Political Research, 12(1), 73–88.
Chwe, M. S.-Y. (1994). Farsighted coalitional stability. Journal of Economic Theory, 63(2), 299–325.
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., and Maskin, E. (1979). The implementation of social choice rules:
Some general results on incentive compatibility. The Review of Economic Studies, 46(2), 185–216.
Demeze-Jouatsa, G. H., Pongou, R., and Tondji, J.-B. (2021). A free and fair economy: A game of
justice and inclusion. Available at SSRN 3893929.
Demuynck, T., Herings, P. J.-J., Saulle, R. D., and Seel, C. (2019). The myopic stable set for social
environments. Econometrica, 87(1), 111–138.
Diermeier, D., Egorov, G., and Sonin, K. (2017). Political economy of redistribution. Econometrica,
85(3), 851–870.
Dubey, P. and Shubik, M. (1977). A closed economy with exogenous uncertainty, different levels
of information, money, futures and spot markets. International Journal of Game Theory, 6(4),
231–248.
Dufwenberg, M. and Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic
Behavior, 47(2), 268–298.
Dutta, B., Sen, A., and Vohra, R. (1994). Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in
economic environments. Economic Design, 1(1), 173–203.
Dutta, B. and Vohra, R. (2017). Rational expectations and farsighted stability. Theoretical Eco-
nomics, 12(3), 1191–1227.
48
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3934127
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881). Mathematical psychics: An essay on the application of mathematics to
the moral sciences. London: Kegan Paul.
Eguia, J. X. and Shepsle, K. A. (2015). Legislative bargaining with endogenous rules. The Journal
of Politics, 77(4), 1076–1088.
Ehlers, L., Peters, H., and Storcken, T. (2002). Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for
one-dimensional single-peaked preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 105(2), 408–434.
Einy, E. and Wettstein, D. (1999). A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets. Review of
Economic Design, 4(3), 219–230.
Evans, G., Heath, A., and Lalljee, M. (1996). Measuring left–right and libertarian–authoritarian
values in the British electorate. British Journal of Sociology, (pp. 93–112).
Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2),
293–315.
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In this supplement, we provide (a) the proof of the non-cooperative implementation of the
reciprocity set (Theorem 3, p. 22); (b) more details on two examples (Example 4, p. 29, and
Example 5, p. 33) covered in the paper: “A Political Reciprocity Mechanism”; and (c) we compare
the reciprocity mechanism and the equilibrium concepts defined in this domain to capture farsighted
behavior to other well-known solution concepts that follow the blocking approach. A political
economy or game is an environment which consists of a set of agents, a policy space, a voting
procedure, a constitution, and a preference profile over the policy space. We denote P the set of
all political economies. In what follows, the political economy derived from the voting procedure
with reciprocity clauses V rm is denoted PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉, where the preference profile
R(θ) = (Ri(θ))i∈N is defined over A with θ being a state of the world (the strict part of Ri(θ)
is denoted Pi(θ), and indifference is denoted Ii(θ)). A policy x ∈ A is (weakly) Pareto-efficient if
there is no y ∈ A such that yPi(θ)x for all i ∈ N .
1 Theorem 3: Implementation of the Reciprocity Set - Proof
We need some additional notation before proving Theorem 3. Let x ∈ A be the status quo and
GNa ∈ FNa(x, θ) be an extensive form game. Let Ω = A×W (C)×N×W (C)×A, and (y, S, i, T, z)
be an element of Ω, with i ∈ T − S, and y 6= x. Let Ex(y, S, i, T, z) denote a possible sequence of
moves in the game GNa (given the status quo x, an agent is recognized and proposes y, S ∈ W (C)
consists of agents who vote to support y against x, Nature continues the game, agent i /∈ S
∗Corresponding authors: Roland Pongou (rpongou@uottawa.ca or rop103@harvard.edu) and Jean-Baptiste Tondji
(jeanbaptiste.tondji@utrgv.edu).
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opposes y, the bill y is not withdrawn, and agents form T ∈ W (C) to support z against y). A
strategy profile m in the game GNa which corresponds to a sequence Ex(y, S, i, T, z) leads to either
y, or z as the final policy, i.e., g(m,x) ∈ {y, z}.
(1) Let PE(θ) be a political economy. Consider GNa ∈ FNa(x, θ) and assume that x ∈ E(P(θ)).
We show that x ∈ SPE(GNa). Suppose that x /∈ SPE(GNa). Then, any strategy profile m̂ ∈ M
which is a constrained subgame perfect equilibrium of the game GNa does not yield x as the
final policy, i.e., g(m̂, x) 6= x. Let m̂ be such a strategy profile. Then, there exists an element
(y, S, i, T, z) ∈ Ω, such that the sequence of moves Ex(y, S, i, T, z) generated from m̂ leads to
either y or z as the final policy, i.e., g(m̂, x) ∈ {y, z}, and g(m̂, x) 6= x. Consequently, yPS(θ)x
and the pair (y, S) is a plausible objection against x. Let (z′, T ′) ∈ A × W (C) be a plausible
counter-objection against (y, S). Then, there exists j ∈ T ′ − S such that xPj(θ)y and z′PT ′(θ)y.
Let m be a strategy profile in the game GNa that yields the sequence of moves Ex(y, S, j, T ′, z′). It
follows that g(m,x) ∈ {y, z′} because Nature (Na) acts after agents form S through voting (V),
and (y, S) is a plausible objection against x. Given that z′PT ′(θ)y, then we must have g(m,x) = z
′.
Therefore, z′RS(θ)x, and the plausible counter-objection (z
′, T ′) against (y, S) is friendly. Hence,
(y, S) is a justified plausible objection, which contradicts the fact that x ∈ E(PE(θ)). It follows
that x ∈ SPE(GNa).
Assume there exists y ∈ SPE(GNa) such that y 6= x. Then, there exists a strategy profile
m̂ ∈ M which is a constrained subgame perfect equilibrium of the game GNa with g(m̂, x) = y.
According to the game GNa, there exists S ∈ W (C) such that yPS(θ)x. Assume that there exists
(z, T ) ∈ A − {y} ×W (C), T 6= S, T ∩ (N − S) 6= ∅, and zPT (θ)y. Let i ∈ T ∩ (N − S) and
consider the strategy profile m = (m̂−i,mi), where agent i opposes y in Step 3, and if recognized
in Step 5 or Step 6, proposes z and votes for z against y, and keeps all other actions according
to m̂i. Given that T ∈ W (C), g(m) = z and ziPi(θ)y, a contradiction, since y ∈ SPE(GNa).
If there is no (z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C) such that zPT (θ)y, then (y, S) is a plausible objection, which
contradicts the fact that x ∈ E(PE(θ)). Therefore, x ∈ E(PE(θ)) implies SPE(GNa) = {x}, for
every GNa ∈ FNa(x, θ).
(2) Let x /∈ E(PE(θ)) and GNa ∈ FNa(x, θ). There exist y ∈ A − {x} and S ∈ W (C)
such that (y, S) is a justified plausible objection against x : yPS(θ)x. Assume that x is the final
policy supported by the constrained subgame perfect equilibrium profile m̂ = (m̂1, ..., m̂n) ∈ M :
g(m̂, x) = x.
a) Assume that there is no plausible counter-objection against y. Let a1 be the first agent in
S according to the protocol φ. By definition, m̂a1 is a best response given any history h
t
a1
, t ∈ T.
Consider the deviation in which agent a1 proposes y in Step 1. There are only two scenarios that
2
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could yield x as the final policy from this deviation.
Case (a-1). The vote in Step 2 favors x against y.
Case (a-2). The vote in Step 2 favors y against x; Nature continues the game; an agent i ∈ N−S
opposes policy y; and members in S fail to maintain y.
Consider Case (a-1). Given that yPS(θ)x with S ∈ W (C), x cannot arise as the final policy of
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Consider Case (a-2). Here, as in Case (a-1), the best response for
each agent in S is to vote “yes” and given that S ∈ W (C), x cannot arise as the final policy of a
constrained subgame perfect equilibrium of the game GNa, which is a contradiction.
b) Assume that there exists a plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against the plausible objection
(y, S). Thus, there exists i ∈ T − S such that xPi(θ)y, and zPT (θ)y. Given that the plausible
objection (y, S) is justified, then zRS(θ)x. Following the same reasoning in Case a), a constrained
subgame perfect equilibrium in the game GNa can yield either y (because Nature acts after the vote
between y and x) or z as the final policy, which is a contradiction.
2 More Elaboration on Examples
2.1 Example 4: Ultimatum game with counter-offer
A population of n agents must share an amount of 100 dollars, with each agent receiving a non-
negative portion. The set of feasible allocations is the simplex:




Assume that the constitution C is the majority rule, and for the state θ ∈ Θ, the preference profile
R(θ) = (Ri(θ))i∈N is defined as follows: for x, y ∈ A, and i ∈ N , yRi(θ)x if ui(y) ≥ ui(x),
where ui : A −→ R is agent i’s payoff function. The decision-making process is as follows. An
arbitrator proposes a status quo allocation x0 = (0, 0, ..., 0). A majority coalition S may propose a
plausible objection (y, S) ∈ A ×W (C) against x0. If there is no opposition, y is implemented. If
there is any opposition, S may withdraw y, leading to each agent receiving zero. But if S chooses
to maintain y following any opposition, another majority coalition T might react by proposing a
plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against (y, S). In this case, z is implemented and each agent i
obtains and consumes his or her payoff zi.
To derive the reciprocity set and the predicted reciprocity set, we assume that there are three




u2(x1, x2, x3) = x2 − 13(x1 − x2)−
1
3
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Assume, for instance, that agents 1 and 2 propose a distribution x = (x1, x2, x3) to agent 3, with
x1 + x2 + x3 = 100. He or she is indifferent between rejecting x and accepting x0 = (0, 0, 0) if
u3(x) = 0, which means that x3 =
1
5
(x1 + x2). Since x1 + x2 + x3 = 100, we have x1 + x2 =
500
6
and therefore x3 =
100
6




x1 + x2 =
500
6
is zero. Given the fact that utilities are symmetric, the same conclusion applies to
each agent. This proves that proposing an allocation that exhausts the total amount of money and
gives less than 100/6 to an agent is rejected. Therefore, the set of the predicted allocations from
the status quo x0 = (0, 0, 0) is:
Ex0(PE(θ))) =
{
(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 100 and xi ≥
100
6
; i = 1, 2, 3
}
.
What about the reciprocity set?
1. Any allocation x = (x1, x2, x3) such that x1 + x2 + x3 < 100 is not a reciprocity equilibrium.









). A is majority-
preferred to x since it is preferred to x by everybody, and no one has an incentive to oppose A,
meaning that (A, {1, 2, 3}) is a justified plausible objection against x.
2. Any allocation that gives all of the money to one agent is not a reciprocity equilibrium. For
instance, consider the allocation x = (100, 0, 0). If x is the status quo, then the majority coalition
that consists of agents 2 and 3 will formulate a plausible objection (y, {2, 3}) against x, where
y = (34, 33, 33). Then, agent 1 will oppose the plausible objection. But agents 2 and 3 will not
withdraw it since they have no incentive to do so. It is obvious that agent 1 can convince agent
2 to formulate a plausible counter-objection ((76, 34, 0), {1, 2}) against (y, {2, 3}). Moreover, any
plausible counter-objection (z, T ) against y is friendly to {2, 3}, which implies that (y, {2, 3}) is a
justified plausible objection against x.
3. Any allocation that gives a strictly positive amount to at least two agents is an equilibrium.
Consider, for instance, the allocation x = (x1, x2, 0), with x1 > 0, x2 > 0, and x1 + x2 = 100. If x
is a status quo, then agent 3 can form a coalition with either agent 1 or agent 2 to initiate a plausible
objection against x. Let us assume that the majority coalition {2, 3} objects against x by proposing
the allocation y = (0, x2 + a, x1 − a), with a > 0 and x1 > a. Agent 1 will oppose this allocation,
causing {2, 3} to either withdraw it or maintain it. But {2, 3} will withdraw this allocation because,
otherwise, agent 1 will form a coalition with either agent 2 or agent 3 to formulate a plausible
counter-objection. Assume, for instance, that agents 1 and 3 form a coalition and propose the
allocation (x1, 0, x2). Then, this will lower the payoff of agent 2. Given the fact that agent 2 is
aware of this possibility, he or she will withdraw from the coalition {2, 3}, which will invalidate the
plausible objection (y, {2, 3}) against the status quo x = (x1, x2, 0). Therefore, there is no plausible
4
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objection against x = (x1, x2, 0). In essence, given the fact that x1 + x2 = 100, it is impossible
to formulate a plausible objection that improves the payoff of every agent. It therefore follows that
x = (x1, x2, 0) is a reciprocity equilibrium. Given the fact that agents have symmetric preferences,
any allocation that gives a positive amount to at least two agents is a reciprocity equilibrium. The
reciprocity set is therefore:
E(PE(θ)) =
(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 100, and there do not exist two agentsi, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (i 6= j) such that xi = xj = 0; i, j = 1, 2, 3
 .
2.2 Example 5: Admitting refugees into a peaceful country
We assume that the decision to admit refugees in a peaceful country is made by the legislators of this
country. The latter derives utility from the number of refugees that it admits. Each legislator has
a different perception of the utility that he or she or the country receives from admitting refugees.
We assume that these considerations are reflected in the legislators’ utility functions. Assume,
for illustration, that there are five legislators who have to decide on the number of refugees to
be admitted. The net utility function of each legislator i is given by: vi(pi) = bi ln(pi) − 15pi,
where pi is legislator i’s peak. Assume that C is the majority rule, and the preference profile
R(θ) = (Ri(θ))i∈N is defined as follows: for p and q number of refugees, and i ∈ N , pRi(θ)q if
vi(p) ≥ vi(q). Observe that this function is single-peaked, with legislator i’s ideal position being
obtained by solving v′i(xi) = 0; this leads to the solution x
∗
i = 5bi. Assume that bi = 6 − i,
i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We can show that the legislators’ peaks are respectively: p∗1 = 25, p∗2 = 20,
p∗3 = 15, p
∗
4 = 10 and p
∗
5 = 5. The peak p
∗
3, which is the optimum of the median legislator, is
the Condorcet winner under the reciprocity mechanism. It follows that p∗3 is the only reciprocity
equilibrium: E(PE(θ)) = {15}.
Now, assume that there are six legislators, with legislator i’s utility function being vi(pi) =
bi ln(pi) − 16pi, where bi = 6 − i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and b6 = 6. The legislators’ peaks are:
p∗6 = 36, p
∗
1 = 30, p
∗
2 = 24, p
∗
3 = 18, p
∗
4 = 12 and p
∗
5 = 6. In this scenario, there is no median
legislator. The reciprocity set consists of p∗2 and p
∗
3. In fact, (p
∗
3, {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}) is a justified plausible
objection against p∗5; (p
∗
3, {1, 2, 3, 6}) is a justified plausible objection against p∗4; (p∗2, {2, 3, 4, 5})
is a justified plausible objection against p∗1; and (p
∗
2, {2, 3, 4, 5}) is a justified plausible objection




2, if each of these
alternatives is selected as the status quo. We can conclude that E(PE(θ)) = {p∗2, p∗3} = {24, 18}.
Therefore, either 18 or 24 refugees will be admitted into the country.
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3 Comparison with Other Voting Procedures
3.1 A Modification of the Reciprocity Mechanism
In this section, we modify the voting procedure, V rm, in the reciprocity mechanism to the procedure
V 1 described below (also see Figure 1). Assume that a society wishes to reform a status quo x ∈ A
by voting. The voting procedure V 1 is comprised of two principal stages.
Stage 1 (Objection). If no winning coalition S proposes an objection (y, S) against x, then x
remains in place, which ends the process. If an objection (y, S) against x exists, y is recognized
as a bill, and another coalition might formulate a counter-objection during the second stage.
Stage 2 (Counter-objection). Suppose that an objection (y, S) against x exists. Another winning
coalition T might propose a counter-objection or an amendment (z, T ) against (y, S). If no
counter-objection to (y, S) exists, then y becomes the new policy, which ends the process. If



































Figure 1: Description of Voting Procedure V 1
The procedure V 1 differs from the voting process V rm in that it does not allow any sponsoring
coalition S to withdraw a bill y once the latter has been introduced. This non-retraction clause is
found in many legislatures. In the Canadian parliamentary system, for instance, there is no disposition
that allows a sponsoring coalition to withdraw a bill before the final vote. In other systems, the
withdrawal of a bill has to receive the unanimous consent of the members of the legislature to be
approved. The procedure V 1 therefore gives any potential second mover T the possibility to free-ride
on the action of S by deviating to a more preferred policy z from the bill y. This deviation still
occurs even if the move from x to y initiated by S does not harm the interests of any member
6
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of T . If the second move is indeed likely to hurt S, S will anticipate this and will refrain from
sponsoring the bill. The analysis reveals that this anticipation may result in a non-Pareto-efficient
policy persisting indefinitely.
We define hereunder the rational behavior of agents under the game induced by the procedure
V 1.
Definition 1. Let PE1(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 1, R(θ)〉 be a political economy, S be a winning coalition,
and x, y ∈ A be two policies.
1. Plausible M-objection: (y, S) is said to be a plausible M-objection against x if yRi(θ)x for
each i ∈ S and yPj(θ)x for some j ∈ S.
2. Plausible M-counter-objection: Let (y, S) be an plausible M-objection against x. A pair
(z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C) is said to be an plausible M-counter-objection against (y, S) if zRi(θ)y
for each i ∈ T and zPj(θ)y for some j ∈ T .
3. Unfriendly plausible M-counter-objection: Let (y, S) be an plausible M-objection against
x and (z, T ) ∈ A ×W (C) be a plausible M-counter-objection against (y, S). The plausible
M-counter-objection (z, T ) is said to be unfriendly if not(zRS(θ)x).
4. Justified plausible M-objection: A plausible M-objection (y, S) against x is said to be
justified if there is no unfriendly plausible M-counter-objection against (y, S).
5. Non-reciprocity set: The non-reciprocity set of the political economy PE1(θ), denoted by
NR(PE1(θ)), is the set of all of the policies in A against which no justified plausible M-
objection exists.1
The rational behavior in games under the modified voting procedure V 1 is defined in accordance
with the same logic as under the reciprocity mechanism. The main difference resides in the conditions
under which a plausible counter-objection is formulated. Under the procedure V 1, any winning
coalition that wishes to deviate from a sponsored bill to a new policy can formulate a plausible
M-counter-objection. Under the reciprocity mechanism, there exists an additional condition, which
is that, any winning coalition T that wishes to deviate from a sponsored bill to a more preferred
policy can rationally do so only if the interests of some of its members would be harmed by the
1The plausible M-objection and M-counter-objection could be defined with strict preferences as for the reciprocity
set. In this case, the set of equilibrium policies would be larger than the non-reciprocity set as currently defined.
Since the non-reciprocity set generally contains non-Pareto-efficient policies as we show below, this larger set also
contains non-Pareto-efficient policies.
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enactment of the bill. In fact, if the enactment of the bill would not harm any member of T ,
any unfriendly plausible counter-objection would cause the first mover S to withdraw its plausible
objection. Therefore the unfriendly plausible counter-objection would be nullified and the status quo
would be maintained. This response would not benefit T . Under the reciprocity mechanism, it is
therefore not rational for T to formulate an unfriendly plausible counter-objection if the plausible
objection does not harm its interests, whereas under the game induced by the procedure V 1, this
is possible. The result confirms that this absence of incentives for reciprocal actions in the voting
procedure V 1 might cause a non-Pareto-efficient policy to persist indefinitely.
Proposition 1. There exists a political economy PE1(θ) ∈ P such that the non-reciprocity set
NR(PE1(θ)) contains a non-Pareto-efficient policy.
Proof. Assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and A = {a, b, c, d, e}. Consider the constitution C defined by
the winning coalitions K = {1, 3, 4}, S = {2, 4, 5}, L = {1, 2, 5}, Q = {2, 3, 4}, and any coalition
that includes K, S, L, or Q, and the preference profile R(θ) is defined as follows:
cP1(θ)bP1(θ)aP1(θ)eP1(θ)d; dP2(θ)cP2(θ)bP2(θ)aP2(θ)e; eP3(θ)bP3(θ)aP3(θ)dP3(θ)c;
eP4(θ)dP4(θ)bP4(θ)aP4(θ)c; and cP5(θ)dP5(θ)eP5(θ)bP5(θ)a.
Let PE1(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 1, R(θ)〉. Figure 2 provides the graph of the popularity relationship
among the policies (for example, the arrow from a to b means that the grand coalition N strictly
prefers policy b to a.). The non-Pareto-efficient policy a is an equilibrium under the political economy
PE1(θ). Even though all of the agents prefer b over a, no winning coalition will formulate a plausible
M-objection against a since this will lead to the election of either d (if coalition L proposes a plausible
M-objection) or e (if coalition S proposes a plausible M-objection). In either case, some member of
the M-objecting coalition will regret, which is the reason why none of these coalitions will form in
order to make a plausible M-objection. This implies that a ∈ NR(PE1(θ)).2
Under the political economy PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉, coalition K, for instance, will
formulate a plausible objection (b,K) against a. Once b is introduced, coalition L will not formulate
a plausible counter-objection (L, c), knowing that such a plausible counter-objection is unfriendly as
it harms the interest of agents 3 and 4 in K. In fact, if it does this, these agents will withdraw from
the winning coalition K, therefore destroying the plausible objection (b,K) and causing a to remain
in place. This response will harm the interest of agents 2 and 5 in the plausible counter-objecting
2Under the voting procedure V 1, in general, some agents who might be willing to participate in a coalition in
order to remove a non-Pareto-efficient status quo fear that the interim policy will be replaced by a new policy which
is worse for them than the status quo.
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Figure 2: Popularity relationship among policies
coalition L. These latter agents will therefore not participate in coalition L and that coalition will
never formulate a plausible counter-objection. Furthermore, coalition S will not formulate a plausible
counter-objection (S, d) since agents 2 and 5 will not participate in that coalition. It follows that a
is not a reciprocity equilibrium. We can show that the reciprocity set is E(PE(θ)) = {b, c, d, e} and
that NR(PE1(θ)) = {a, b, c, d, e}.
3.2 One-shot Games
The one-shot game is derived from a voting procedure in which policy selection entails only one
stage: a challenger is pitted against an incumbent policy, and if a winning coalition votes for
change, the incumbent is replaced by the new policy and the selection process ends. Otherwise, the
incumbent remains in place and the selection process ends. Let V 2 represents a one-stage voting
procedure described above, and PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R(θ)〉 denotes a one-shot political economy.
Many solution concepts have been defined to capture rationality in this class of games. The most
prominent are the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), the core (Gillies, 1959), the top cycle set (Schwartz, 1976), and the uncovered set (Miller,
1980). A common feature of these solution concepts is that they are all based on the notion of
direct domination. Their definitions are recalled below.
Definition 2. Let PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R(θ)〉 be a one-shot political economy, X be a subset
of A, and x and y be two policies.
• y is said to directly dominate x if there exist a winning coalition S ∈ W (C) that prefers y
over x, that is, yPS(θ)x. If y directly dominates x, we say that y majority-defeats (or simply
defeats) x.
9
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• The core is the set of all of the policies that are not directly defeated.
• X is a vNM stable set if it satisfies the following stability conditions:
1. (Internal stability): no policy in X is directly defeated by another policy in X; and
2. (External stability): every policy not in X is directly defeated by some policy in X.
• The top cycle set, denoted as TC(PE2(θ)), is the smallest subset of the policy space A, where
every policy in TC(PE2(θ)) defeats every other policy not in TC(PE2(θ)).
• y is said to cover x if every policy z that is defeated by x is also defeated by y. An uncovered
policy is such that there is no other policy that covers it. The uncovered set, denoted as
UC(PE2(θ)), is the set of uncovered policies in A.
It is easy to prove that a non-Pareto-efficient policy cannot belong to the core, or to a vNM
stable set, or to the uncovered set. These equilibrium concepts share this feature with the reciprocity
set. However, we prove hereunder that there exists a political economy for which the reciprocity set
is not empty, the core is empty, a vNM stable set does not exist, and the top cycle set contains a
non-Pareto-efficient policy.
Proposition 2. There exists a one-shot political economy PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R(θ)〉 ∈ P such
that:
1. the reciprocity set E(PE(θ)) is not empty, where PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉;
2. the core of the one-shot game PE2(θ) is empty;
3. a vNM stable set of the one-shot game PE2(θ) does not exist; and
4. the top-cycle set of the one-shot game PE2(θ) contains a non-Pareto-efficient policy.
Proof. Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A = {a, b, c, d, e}, the constitution C defined by the winning
coalitions K = {1, 3, 4}, S = {2, 4, 5}, L = {1, 2, 5}, Q = {2, 3, 4}, and any coalition that includes
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Let denote PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R(θ)〉 and PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉 .
1. As is shown in the proof of Proposition 1, the reciprocity mechanism is given by E(PE(θ)) =
{b, c, d, e}. The reciprocity mechanism expels the non-Pareto-efficient policy a.
2. We can observe in Figure 2 that, for any policy x ∈ A, there exists another policy y ∈ A and
a winning coalition S ∈ W (C) such that all agents in S prefer y over x. This shows that the core
of the one-shot game PE2(θ) is empty.
3. In the one-shot game PE2(θ), there is no vNM stable set. In fact, c defeats a, c defeats b,
c defeats e, b defeats a, d defeats a, d defeats b, d defeats c, e defeats d. Hence, no subset of the
policy set A satisfies the vNM external and internal stability conditions.
4. The top cycle set of the one-shot game PE2(θ) contains all the policies in A. In fact, a policy
does not belong to TC(PE2(θ)) if and only if it is defeated by each policy in TC(PE2(θ)); this
condition is not satisfied for any of the policies in A. Then, TC(PE2(θ)) = A, and it contains the
non-Pareto-efficient policy a.
We also have the following result comparing the uncovered set and the reciprocity set.
Proposition 3. The following statements hold:
1. the uncovered set mechanically protects minority interests.
2. the uncovered set does not strategically protect minority interests.
3. There exists a one-shot political economy PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R′(θ)〉 such that the reci-
procity set of the game PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R′(θ)〉 strictly refines the uncovered set:
E(PE(θ)) $ UC(PE2(θ)).
Proof. To prove statements 1. and 2., let consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, A = {a, b, c, d}, C the
majority rule, and the preference profile R(θ) defined as follows:
bP1(θ)dP1(θ)cP1(θ)a; dP2(θ)bP2(θ)cP2(θ)a; cP3(θ)bP3(θ)dP3(θ)a;
cP4(θ)bP4(θ)aP4(θ)d; aP5(θ)dP5(θ)cP5(θ)b; and aP6(θ)dP6(θ)cP6(θ)b.
Let S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, T = {3, 4, 5, 6}, and U = {1, 2, 5, 6}. The domination or popularity graph
among policies based on preferences is provided in Figure 3. Let PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R(θ)〉.
1. Let denote by D(x) the set of all the alternatives that are defeated by the policy x. By
the definition of the uncovered set, x ∈ UC(PE2(θ)) if and only if there is no y ∈ A such that
D(x) ⊆ D(y). We have D(a) = ∅, D(b) = {a}, D(c) = {a, b}, and D(d) = {c}. It follows
that, either b or c covers a, and c covers b. Only c and d are uncovered, and the uncovered set
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Figure 3: Uncovered set versus Reciprocity set (the arrows indicate the direction of the popularity
relationship; for instance b is a more popular policy than a because b is preferred over a by the
majority coalition S)
is UC(PE2(θ)) = {c, d}. Since the alternative c is a minority option and c ∈ UC(PE2(θ)), the
uncovered set mechanically protects minority interests.
2. The alternative c is not a non-strategic minority option, since d is a majority option that
defeats c. Given that c ∈ UC(PE2(θ)), it follows that the uncovered set does not strategically
protect minority interests.
3. We modify the environment above only by changing the preference profile R(θ) to the profile







































Figure 4: Popularity Relationship Under R′(θ)
The popularity relationship among policies based on the new preference profile R′(θ) is provided
in Figure 4. Let PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R′(θ)〉 and PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R′(θ)〉. We have
D(a) = ∅, D(b) = {a}, and D(c) = {b}. Thus, E(PE(θ)) = {c} and UC(PE2(θ)) = {b, c}.
Proposition 3 shows that the reciprocity set and the uncovered set have very different properties
and predictions. For instance, consider a political economy PE2(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 2, R(θ)〉 that
consists of a society that has four ethnic groups. This society has to choose from a set of three
languages, the ones to be used both in school and in official communication. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
be the set of ethnic groups and L = {l1, l2, l3} be the set of languages. Each ethnic group has one
representative. Language l3 is the most commonly spoken language in ethnic groups 1 and 2; l2 is the
native language of ethnic group 3; and l1 is a minority language that is mostly spoken in ethnic group
4. The preference profile R(θ) is presented as follows. Ethnic group 1: l3P1(θ)l2P1(θ)l1; ethnic group
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2: l3P2(θ)l2P2(θ)l1; ethnic group 3: l2P3(θ)l1P3(θ)l3; and ethnic group 4: l1P4(θ)l3P4(θ)l2. We
suppose that the constitution C is the majority rule. Figure 5 shows the popularity relationship among
the various languages (for example, l3 is more popular than l2 as the former is preferred by three out of
the four ethnic groups). One can prove that E(PE(θ)) = {l1, l3}, whereas UC(PE2(θ)) = {l2, l3},
l1 l2 l3
{1,2,3} {1,2,4}
Figure 5: Popularity relationship among various languages
with PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉. Interestingly, both solution concepts select l3 as an official
language. However, while the reciprocity set selects the strategic minority option l1, the uncovered
set selects the non-strategic minority option l2, which proves that the two solution concepts have a
very different incentives structure.
3.3 Farsighted Coalitional Games
In farsighted coalitional games, agents or coalitions may bargain indefinitely. In a game, a status
quo a0 is randomly chosen from the set of policies. If no winning coalition replaces a0, then it
remains in place on an indefinite basis and the game ends. If a winning coalition S replaces a0, say
with a1, then a1 becomes the new status quo, and the process restarts, continuing until a policy has
been reached to which no winning coalition is willing to object. Once that policy has been reached,
each agent earns and consumes his or her payoff and the game ends. Figure 6 illustrates this voting
procedure, that we denote by V 3. We also denote by PE3(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 3, R(θ)〉 a political
economy or farsighted coalitional game. The most prominent equilibrium concepts in this class of
games are based on the notion of indirect domination (Harsanyi (1974), Chwe (1994)), which is a
modification of direct domination, whereby first movers anticipate future moves. We recall their
definitions below.
Definition 3. Let PE3(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 3, R(θ)〉 be a farsighted coalitional game, K be a subset
of A, and a and b be two policies.
A) Alternative b is said to farsightedly dominate a, denoted as bH a, if there exists a sequence
of policies a0, a1, ..., am ∈ A (where a0 = a and am = b) and a sequence of winning coalitions
S0, S1, ..., Sm−1 such that ai+1 directly dominates ai Si+1 and bPSi(θ)ai for i = 0, 1, ...,m− 1.
B) K is a farsighted stable set if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. (Internal stability): no policy in K is farsightedly defeated by any other policy in K; and
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a1: new status quo
a2: new status quo












































The game continues and ends
when an equilibrium policy is reached.
Figure 6: Description of Voting Procedure V 3
2. (External stability): every policy not in K is farsightedly defeated by some policies in K.
Definition 4. Let PE3(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 3, R(θ)〉 be a farsighted coalitional game, X be a subset
of A, and a and b be two policies.
A) Alternative b is said to indirectly dominate a, denoted as bC a, if there exists a sequence
of policies a0, a1, ..., am ∈ A (where a0 = a and am = b) and a sequence of winning coalitions
S0, S1, ..., Sm−1 such that ai −→Si ai+1 and bPSi(θ)ai for i = 0, 1, ...,m−1. The relation a −→S b
means that, if a is a status quo, S has the power to make b the new status quo.
B) X is said to be consistent if:
f(X) =
a ∈ A : ∀d ∈ A, S ∈ W (C), ∃e ∈ X, wheree = d or eC d and not(aPS(θ)e)
 = X.
C) The largest consistent set is the union of all the consistent sets of PE3(θ).
These solution concepts formalize the notion that a coalition that moves from a status quo to
an alternative policy anticipates the possibility that another coalition might react. A third coalition
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might in turn react, and so on, without limit. It is therefore important to act in a way that does
not lead a coalition to ultimately regret its action. Exactly what happens during the intermediate
stages might not matter, as a coalition simply wants to be better off in terms of the final option
relative to a status quo.
The procedure V 3 differs from V rm in two major respects. First, V rm is finite and involves only
three stages. Second, under V 3, a coalition does not have the possibility to revise or withdraw its
move. For these reasons, these procedures yield different equilibrium and welfare properties, as we
show below.
Proposition 4. There exists a political economy PE3(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 3, R(θ)〉 ∈ P such that:
1. the reciprocity set E(PE(θ)) is not empty, where PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉;
2. there is no Harsanyi stable set in the farsighted coalitional game PE3(θ); and
3. the largest consistent set of the farsighted coalitional game PE3(θ) contains a non-Pareto-
efficient policy.
Proof. Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A = {a, b, c, d, e}, the constitution C defined by the winning
coalitions K = {1, 3, 4}, S = {2, 4, 5}, L = {1, 2, 5}, Q = {2, 3, 4}, and any coalition that includes
K, S, L, or Q, and the preference profile R(θ) defined as follows:
cP1(θ)bP1(θ)aP1(θ)eP1(θ)d; dP2(θ)cP2(θ)bP2(θ)aP2(θ)e; eP3(θ)bP3(θ)aP3(θ)dP3(θ)c;
eP4(θ)dP4(θ)bP4(θ)aP4(θ)c; and cP5(θ)dP5(θ)eP5(θ)bP5(θ)a.
Let PE3(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V 3, R(θ)〉 and PE(θ) = 〈N,A, C, V rm, R(θ)〉. Figure 2 provides the graph
of the popularity relationship among the policies. We can also view Figure 2 as the graph of
“effectiveness relations (−→S)” (Chwe, 1994). It is straightforward to prove the following: cC a,
c C b, c C e, b C a, d C a, d C b, d C c and e C d. Note that in this environment,
the binary relations H and C are equivalent.
1. It is already presented in the previous proof (Proposition 1) that the reciprocity set is non-
empty and contains only Pareto-efficient policies: E(PE(θ)) = {b, c, d, e}.
2. Using Figure 2 and the farsighted domination H , we can conclude that there is no subset
of policy set A that satisfies the internal and the external stability conditions in the game PE3(θ).
Therefore, no Harsanyi stable set exists.
3. Now, we determine the largest consistent set. We start with X = A. It turns out that
f(X) = X and A is the largest consistent set. For instance, starting with policy a, there are three
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possibilities: either coalition L will move from a to c, or coalition R will move from a to d, or all
agents will move from a to b. For each initial move, there is a subsequent move that reaches either
e, or d or c and in which some agent in the coalition that initiated the move from a is worse off.
For these reasons, the inefficient policy a belongs to the largest consistent set. Following the same
reasoning, we can show that the largest consistent set is equal to A.
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